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THE YEAR IN REVIEW: A Discussion of
Significant Requlations., Rulings and Cases
I.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

This
A.
Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act (H.R. 9).
with
Bill includes many of the proposals found in the Contract
America issued January 10, 1995.
1.

50 Percent Capital Gains Deduction --

a.
The Bill would allow all taxpayers (both
individual and corporate) a deduction equal to 50 percent of net
capital gain for the taxable year. The effective rate for an
individual in the highest rate bracket would be 19.8 percent, and
the effective rate for a corporation in the highest rate bracket
would be 17.5 percent.
The Bill would repeal the provisions in the
b.
.Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 allowing a capital gain
exclusion for sales of certain small business stock.
The Bill would reinstate the rule which
c.
requires two dollars of long-term capital loss of an individual
to offset one dollar of. ordinary income.
d.
These provisions generally would apply to
taxable years ending after December 31, 1994.
Indexing of Basis of Certain Assets for Purposes
2.
of Determining Gain or Loss -- The Bill generally would provide
for an inflation adjustment to the basis of certain assets for
,
purposes of determining gain or loss upon a sale or other
disposition of such assets after December 31, 1994, in taxable
years ending after that date.
a.
Assets which would be eligible for the
inflation adjustment generally would include corporate stock and
tangible property that is a capital asset or property used in a
trade or business and held by the taxpayer for more than one
year.
The inflation adjustment would not apply to
b.
stock in an S corporation, stock in a foreign corporation,
preferred stock that does not participate in corporate growth to
any significant extent, any mortgage or other creditor's interest
in property, a lessor's interest in property subject to a net
lease, property using neutral cost recovery or property sold to a
related person.
c.
Indexing adjustments would apply in computing
the taxable income and the earnings and profits of a RIC or REIT,
1615C590.2H

but they would not apply in determining whether a corporation
qualifies as a RIC or REIT.
With respect to installment sales, the
d.
inflation adjustment of the seller would not take into account
any periods after the sale is made.
e.
The inflation adjustment would be measured by
increases in the Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") deflator
occurring after December 31, 1994, regardless of whether the
asset was acquired by the taxpayer prior to that date.
Capital Loss Deduction Allowed with Respect to
3.
Sale or ExchanQe of Principal Residence -- The Bill would provide
that losses from the sale or exchange of a principal residence
would be treated as a deductible capital loss, rather than a
nondeductible personal loss. The provision would be effective
for sales and exchanges after December 31, 1994, in taxable years
ending after such date.
4.

Neutral Cost Recovery -- For MACRS property placed

in service after December 31, 1994, the Bill would allow a
taxpayer to elect, on a property-by-property basis, to determine
depreciation deductions under present law or under a new neutral
cost recovery system (NCRS).
5.
Increase in Unified Estate and Gift Tax Credits -The bill would gradually increase the present law unified credit
of $192,800 to $248,300 over a three-year period (i.e., the fully
phased-in amount would effectively exempt $750,000 in taxable
transfers from the Federal estate and gift tax).
a.
After 1998, the unified credit would be
indexed for inflation each year by multiplying the applicable
exclusion amount of $750,000 by a cost of living adjustment.
The provision would apply to the estates of
b.
decedents dying, and gifts made, after December 31, 1995.
6.

Sec. 179, I.R.C. ExpensinQ Election -- The bill

would increase the $17,500 amount allowed to be expensed under
Sec. 179, I.R.C. to $25,000.
This
Small Investors Tax Relief Act of 1995 (S. 181).
B.
Bill would index the basis of capital assets in a manner similar
to the indexing provision contained in H.R. 9 for capital assets
disposed of after December 31, 1994. The primary difference is
that this Bill would use changes in the Consumer Price Index,
rather than the Gross Domestic Product, as the applicable measure
of inflation. This Bill would also allow an individual to take a
deduction for any taxable year equal to the lesser of the
individual's net capital gain for the year or $10,000.
1615Cs90.2H
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C.
The Capital Formation and Job Creation Act of 1995 (S.
182).
This Bill would provide for a 50 percent deduction for
capital gains, the indexation of capital assets, and a capital
loss deduction on the sale or exchange of a principal residence.
These provisions are identical to the provisions of H.R. 9.
II.

PROPOSED AND FINAL REGULATIONS

A.
Sec. 263A(f), I.R.C. (Reauirement to Capitalize
Interest with Respect to Production of Property).
1.
Effective Date -- On December 29, 1994, the
Service issued final Regulations §§1.263A-8 through -15 relating
to the requirement to capitalize interest with respect to the
production of property. These Regulations generally apply to
interest incurred in taxable years beginning on or after January
1, 1995. Reg. §l.263A-15(a)(1). For taxable years beginning
before January 1, 1995, taxpayers must take reasonable positions
on their Federal income tax returns when applying Sec. 263A(f),
I.R.C. A reasonable position is a position consistent with the
Temporary Regulations, Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures,
Notices and Announcements concerning Sec. 263A, I.R.C. Reg.
§1.263A-15 (a)(2).
2.

Anti-Abuse Rule -- The interest capitalization

rules must be applied by the taxpayer in a manner that is
consistent with, and reasonably carries out, the purposes of Sec.
263A(f), I.R.C. The District Director may, based upon all the
facts and circumstances, determine the amount of interest that
must be capitalized in a manner that is consistent with, and
reasonably carries out, the purposes of Sec. 263A(f), I.R.C.
Reg. §1.263A-15(c).
3.

Ordering Rules --

a.
Interest must be capitalized under Sec.
263A(f), I.R.C. before the application of Secs. 163(d), 163(j),
266, 469 and 861, I.R.C.
If, after the application of Sec.
263A(f), I.R.C., interest is deferred under any of these
Sections, that interest is not subject to capitalization in any
subsequent taxable year. Reg. §l.263A-9(g) (1)(i).
b.
Interest that is subject to a deferral
provision, including Secs. 163(e) (3), 267, 446 and 461, I.R.C.,
is subject to capitalization under Sec. 263A(f), I.R.C. only in
the taxable year in which it would be deducted if Sec. 263A(f),

I.R.C. did not apply. Thus, a deferral Section is applied prior
to the application of Sec. 263A(f), I.R.C. Reg. §1.263A9(g) ( )(ii).

1615C590.2H

-
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4.

General Rule -- Capitalization of interest under

the avoided cost method is required with respect to the
production of designated property. Reg. §1.263A-8(a) (1).
a.

Definition of DesiQnated Property

--

(1) Real property; or
(2) Tangible personal property which meets
any of the following criteria:
(a) Property with a class life of 20
years, but only if the property is not property described in Sec.
1221(1), I.R.C. in the hands of the taxpayer or a related person;
(b) Property with an estimated
production period exceeding 2 years; or
(c) Property with an estimated
production period exceeding 1 year and an estimated cost of
production exceeding $1,000,000. Reg. §l.263A-8(b) (1).
b.

De Minimis Rule -- Designated property does

not include property for which the production period does not
exceed 90 days and the total production expenditures do not
exceed $1,000,000 divided by the number of days in the production
period. Reg. §l.263A-8(b)(4).
c.

Definition of Real Property -- Real property

includes land, unsevered natural products of land, buildings and
inherently permanent structures. Reg. §1.263A-8(c) (1).
(1) Unsevered natural products of land
includes growing crops and plants, mines, wells and other natural
deposits. Growing crops and plants, however, are real property
only if the preproductive period of the crop or plant exceeds 2
years. Reg. §1.263A-8(c)(2).
(2) Inherently permanent structures include
property that is affixed to real property and that would
ordinarily remain affixed for an indefinite period of time.
Reg. §1.263A-8(c) (3). A structure that is in the nature of
machinery or is essentially an item of machinery or equipment is
not an inherently permanent structure and is not real property.
Reg. §1.263A-8(c) (4).
5.
The Avoided Cost Method -- Generally, any
interest that the taxpayer theoretically would have avoided if
accumulated production expenditures had been used to repay or
reduce the taxpayer's outstanding debt must be capitalized. Reg.
§l.263A-9(a) (1).
1615C590.2H
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a.

Interest -- Applicable interest includes all

amounts that are characterized as interest expense under any Code
Section, including, for example, Secs. 482, 483, 1272, 1274 and
7872, I.R.C. Reg. §l.263A-9(a) (3).
b.

Method -- The avoided cost method requires

the capitalization for each unit of designated property of -(1) The traced debt amount and
(2) The excess expenditure amount.

Reg.

§l.263A-9(a) (2) (i).
c.
Comparison to Financial AccountinQ Method -The avoided cost method is applied without regard to any
financial or regulatory accounting principles for the
capitalization of interest. Reg. §1.263A-9(g) (4).
6.

Traced Debt Amount --

Interest must be

capitalized with respect to a unit of designated property in an
amount equal to the total interest incurred on the traced debt
during each measurement period. Reg. §1.263A-9(b) (1).
a.

Definition of Traced Debt -- Traced debt is

outstanding eligible debt that is allocated to accumulated
production expenditures with respect to a unit of designated
property under the rules of Temp. Reg. §1.163-8T. Reg. §1.263A9(b) (2).
b.

Eliqible Debt -- Under Reg. §l.263A-9(a) (4),

eligible debt is all debt except
(1) debt that is disallowed under a
provision described in Temp. Reg. §1.163-8T(m) (7) (ii);
(2) debt, such as accounts payable and other
accrued items, that bears no interest;
(3) debt that is borrowed directly or
indirectly from a person related to the taxpayer and bears a rate
of interest that is less than the AFR;
(4) debt bearing personal interest;
(5) debt bearing qualified residence
interest;
(6) debt incurred by an organization that is
exempt from income tax under Sec. 501(a), I.R.C.;

1615CS90.2H
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(7) reserves, deferred tax liabilities and
similar items that are not treated as debt for Federal income tax
purposes; and
(8) Federal, state and local income tax
liabilities, deferred tax liabilities under Sec. 453A, I.R.C and
hypothetical tax liabilities under the look-back method of Sec.
460(b), I.R.C. or similar provisions.
c.

Election Not to Trace Debt -- Taxpayers may

elect not to trace debt. If the election is made, all interest
and debt fall under the rules relating to the excess expenditure
amount. This election is a method of accounting. Reg. §1.263A9(d) (1).
7.

Excess Expenditure Amount -- If there are

accumulated production expenditures in excess of traced debt, the
taxpayer must capitalize the excess expenditure amount. Reg.
§1.263A-9(c) (1).
Excess Expenditure Amount -- For each unit of
a.
property, this amount equals the product of --

(1) The average excess expenditures for the
unit of property (which.is computed by --

(a) determining the amount (if any) by
which accumulated production expenditures exceed traced debt at
each measurement date during the computation period; and
(b) dividing the sum of these amounts
by the number of measurement dates during the computation
period); and
(2) The weighted average interest rate
(which is determined by dividing interest incurred on nontraced
Reg. §1.263Adebt during the period by average nontraced debt).
9(c) (1).
b.

Interest --

With respect to an excess

expenditure amount, interest incurred during the computation
period is capitalized from the following sources and in the
following sequence but not in excess of the excess expenditure
amount for all units of designated property:
(1) Interest incurred on nontraced debt
(which is all eligible debt other than traced debt);
(2) Interest relating to certain borrowings
from related persons; and

1615C590.2H
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(3) Guaranteed payments for the use of
capital that would have been deductible by the partnership if
Sec. 263A(f), I.R.C. did not apply. Reg. §1.263A-9(c) (2).
8.

Selection of Computation and Measurement

Periods --

a.

Computation Period -- A taxpayer may (but is

not required to) make the avoided cost calculation on the basis
of a full taxable year. If the taxpayer uses a shorter
computation period, the computation period may not include
portions of more than one taxable year and, except as provided in
the case of short taxable years, each computation period within a
taxable year must be the same length. Reg. §1.263A-9(f) (1)(i).
(1) The choice of a computation period is a
method of accounting. Reg. §1.263A-9(f) (1)(ii).
(2) The avoided cost method applies to the
production of a unit of designated property on the basis of a
full computation period, regardless of whether the production
period for the unit of designated property begins or ends during
the computation period. Reg. §1.263A-9(f) (1)(iii).
b.

Measurement Period -- If a taxpayer uses the

taxable year as the computation period, measurement dates must
occur at quarterly or more frequent regular intervals. If the
taxpayer uses computation periods that are shorter than the
taxable year, measurement dates must occur at least twice during
each computation period and at least four times during the
taxable year.
(1) Measurement dates must occur at equal
intervals during each computation period that falls within a
single taxable year.
(2) A taxpayer is permitted to modify the
frequency of measurement dates from year to year. Reg. §1.263A9(f) (2) (i).
C.

Anti-Abuse Rule -- When, in his or her

opinion, more frequent measurement dates are necessary to
determine capitalized interest consistent with the principles and
purposes of Sec. 263A(f), I.R.C. for a particular computation
period, the District Director may require the use of the same.
Reg. §1.263A-9(f) (2)(iv).
d.

Split Measurement Dates -- If a significant

segment of the taxpayer's production activities requires more
frequent measurement dates than another significant segment, the
taxpayer may request a ruling for a taxable year and all
subsequent taxable years in order to segregate the two segments
1615CS90.2H
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All

and use different sets of measurement periods.
9(f) (2)(iv).
Unit of Real Property -9.
is composed of --

Reg. §l.263A-

A unit of real property

Any components of real property owned by the
a.
taxpayer or a related person that are functionally interdependent
and an allocable share of any common feature owned by the
taxpayer or a related person that is real property; and
(1) Definition of functional interdependence
-- Components are functionally interdependent if the placing in
service of one component is dependent on the placing in service
of the other component by the taxpayer or a related person.
Components of real property are functionally interdependent if
they are customarily sold as a single unit. Reg. §l.263A10(b)(2).
(2)

Definition of a common feature -- A

common feature generally includes any real property that benefits
real property produced by, or for, the taxpayer or a related
person, and that is not separately held for the production of
income. Reg. §l.263A-10(b) (3).
b.
The portion of land included in a unit of
real property includes
(1) land on which real property (including a
common feature) included in the unit is situated,
(2) land subject to setback restrictions
with respect to such property, and
(3) any other contiguous portion of the
tract of land other than land that the taxpayer holds for a
purpose unrelated to the unit being produced. Reg. §l.263A10(b)(1).

10. Accumulated Production Expenditures -- Generally,
the term means the cumulative amount of direct and indirect costs
that are required to be capitalized with respect to the unit of
property under Sec. 263A(a), I.R.C. Reg. §1.263A-ll(a).
Such costs are taken into account in the
a.
computation of accumulated production expenditures at the time
and to the extent they would otherwise be taken into account
under the taxpayer's method of accounting. Reg. §1.263A11(b)(1).
b.
The costs of raw materials, supplies or
similar items are taken into-account as accumulated production
1615CS90.2H
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expenditures when they are incurred and dedicated to production
of a unit of property. Dedicated means the first date items are
specifically associated with the production of any unit of
property. Reg. §l.263A-ll(b) (2).
c.
The accumulated production expenditures of a
common feature or land that benefits more than one unit of real
property, or that benefits designated property and property other
than designated property, is apportioned among the units of
designated property. The apportionment of the accumulated costs
of the common feature generally may be made using any method that
is applied on a consistent basis and that reasonably reflects the
benefits provided. Reg. §l.263A-10(b) (4).
d.
There are special rules with respect to how
accumulated production expenditures are counted when units of
real property are constructed in phases or with common features.
Reg. §1.263A-10(b)(5).
For property produced under a contract, the
e.
customer's accumulated production expenditures include any
payments under the contract that represent part of the purchase
price of the unit and any other costs incurred by the customer.
For the contractor, the cumulative amount of payments made by the
customer under the contract attributable to the unit of property
is a reduction in the contractor's accumulated production
expenditures. Reg. §1.263A-Ii(c).
f.
Accumulated production expenditures include
the adjusted bases of any equipment, facilities, or other similar
assets, used in a reasonably proximate manner for the production
of a unit during any measurement period in which the asset is so
used. A taxpayer apportions the adjusted basis of an asset used
in the production of more than one unit in a measurement period
among such units using reasonable criteria. Reg. §1.263A11(d) (1).
11. Production Period -- The production period begins
on the date that production of the unit of real property begins.
Reg. §1.263A-12(c) (1).
The production period for a unit of real
a.
property produced for self-use ends on the date that the unit is
placed in service, and all production activities reasonably
expected to be undertaken by, or for, the taxpayer or a related
person are completed. Reg. §l.263A-12(d) (1).
b.
The production period for a unit of real
property produced for sale ends on the date that the unit is
ready to be held for sale and all production activities
reasonably expected to be undertaken by, or for, the taxpayer or
a related person are completed. Reg. §1.263A-12(d) (1).
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c.
The production period of a unit of real
property begins on the first date that any physical production
activity is performed with respect to a unit of real property.
Reg. §l.263A-12(d) (2).
(1) The production period of a unit of real
property produced under a contract begins for the contractor on
the date the contractor begins physical production activity on
the property.
(2) The production period of a unit of real
property produced under a contract begins for the customer on the
date either the customer or the contractor begins physical
production activity on the property.
d.
The term physical production activities
includes any physical activity that constitutes production within
the meaning of Reg. §l.263A-8(d) (1).
The following is a partial
list of activities any one of which constitutes a physical
production activity with respect to the production of real
property:
(1) Clearing, grading or excavating raw
land;
(2) Demolishing a building or gutting a
standing building;
(3) Engaging in the construction of
infrastructure, such as roads, sewers, sidewalks, cables and
wiring;
(4) Undertaking structural, mechanical or
electrical activities with respect to a building or other
structure; or
(5) Engaging in landscaping activities.
Reg. §1.263A-12(e).
B.

Sec. 469, I.R.C. (Definition of Activity).
1.

Effective Date -- On October 4, 1994, the Service

released final Regulations defining the term "activity" for
purposes of applying the passive loss rules. In general, these
Regulations are effective for taxable years ending after May 10,
1992. However, for taxable years in which these Regulations
apply and that begin before October 4, 1994, a taxpayer may
determine its tax liability in accordance with Prop. Reg. §1.4694 (published at 1992-1 C.B. 1219).
For taxable years ending on
or before May 10, 1992, taxpayers must apply the rules of Temp.
Reg. §1.469-4T. For the taxable year that includes May 10, 1992,
1615C590.2H
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taxpayers may choose to apply the rules in Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T,
rather than the rules in these Regulations. Reg. §1.469-11(b).
2.

Trade or Business Activity -- Trade or business

activities are activities other than rental activities or
activities which are incidental to holding property for
investment which (a) involve the conduct of a trade or business
under Sec. 162, I.R.C.; (b) are conducted in anticipation of the
beginning of a trade or business; or (c) involve research and
development expenditures. Reg. §1.469-4(b) (1).
3.

Rental Activity -- Rental activities are

activities which fall within the meaning of Temp. Reg. §1.4691T(e) (3).
4.

GroupinQ Rules -- Activities may be grouped if the

activities constitute an appropriate economic unit.
4(c).
a.

Reg. §1.469-

Most Important Factors -- The following five

factors are the most important in making this facts and
circumstances determination:
(1) Similarities and differences in types of
trades or businesses;
(2) The extent of common control;
(3) The extent of common ownership;
(4) Geographical location; and
activities.

(5) Interdependencies between or among the
(2).
§1.469-4(c)
Reg.
b.

Rules Limiting Taxpayer's Ability to Group --

(1) A rental activity may not be grouped
with a trade or business activity unless the activities being
grouped together constitute an appropriate economic unit AND
(a) The rental activity is
insubstantial in relation to the trade or business activity;
(b) The trade or business activity is
insubstantial in relation to the rental activity; or
(c) Each owner of the trade or business
activity has the same proportionate ownership interest in the
rental activity, in which case the portion of the rental activity
that involves the rental of items of property for use in the
1615Cs90.2H
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trade or business activity may be grouped with the trade or
business activity. Reg. §1.469-4(d) (1).
(2) An activity involving the rental of real
property and an activity involving the rental of personal
property may not be treated as a single activity. Reg. §1.4694(d)(2).
(3) A taxpayer that owns an interest as a
limited partner or a limited entrepreneur in an activity
described in Sec. 465(c) (1), I.R.C. may not group that activity
with any other activity. However, a taxpayer may group such an
activity with another activity in the same type of business if
the grouping constitutes an appropriate economic unit. Reg.
§1.469-4(d) (3).
(4) A C corporation subject to Sec. 469,
I.R.C., an S corporation or-a partnership must group its
activities under the rules of this Section. Once the entity
groups its activities, a shareholder or partner may group those
activities. However, a shareholder or partner may not treat
activities grouped together by an entity as separate activities.
Reg. §1.469-4(d) (5).
c.

Rules ReQardinQ ReQroupinQ

--

(1) Once a taxpayer has grouped activities
under this Section, the taxpayer may not regroup those activities
unless it is determined that a taxpayer's original grouping was
clearly inappropriate or a material change has occurred that
makes the original grouping clearly inappropriate. In such a
situation, the taxpayer must regroup. Reg. §1.469-4(e).
(2) Note that taxpayers who grouped
activities under the rules in the Temporary Regulations must
regroup if their activities are not appropriate economic units
under Reg. §1.469-4. Reg. §1.469-11(b) (2) (ii).
(3) The Commissioner may regroup a
taxpayer's activities if any grouping does not constitute an
appropriate economic unit and a principal purpose of the
taxpayer's grouping was to circumvent the underlying purposes of
Sec. 469, I.R.C. Reg. §1.469-4(f) (1).
d.
A taxpayer may, for the taxable year in which
there is a disposition of substantially all of an activity, treat
the part disposed of as a separate activity, but only if the
taxpayer can establish with reasonable certainty:
(1) The amount of deductions and credits
carried over to that part of the activity for the taxable year
and
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(2) The amount of gross income and of any
other deductions and credits allocable to that part of the
activity for the taxable year. Reg. § 1.469-4(g).
C.
Sec. 469(c) (7), I.R.C. (Rules for Rental Real Estate
Activities of Taxpayers Engaged in Certain Real Property Trades
or Businesses).
1.
Effective Date -- On January 9, 1995, the Service
issued Proposed Regulations providing rules for rental real
estate activities of taxpayers engaged in certain real property
trades or businesses. These rules will be effective for taxable
years beginning on or after January 1, 1995. The election to
treat all interests in rental real estate as one activity is made
with returns filed on or after January 1, 1995. Prop. Reg.
§1.469-11(a) (3).
2.

Real Property Trades or Businesses -- The

determination of a taxpayer's real property trades or businesses
is based on all of the relevant facts and circumstances. A
taxpayer may use any reasonable method of applying the facts and
circumstances in determining the real property trades or
businesses in which the taxpayer provides personal services.
However, once a taxpayer determines the real property trades or
businesses in which personal services are provided, the taxpayer
may not redetermine those real property trades or businesses in
subsequent taxable years unless the original determination was
clearly inappropriate or there has been a material change in the
facts and circumstances that makes the original determination
clearly inappropriate. Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(d).
3.
Rule for GroupinQ Rental Real Estate Activities -Unless a taxpayer elects to aggregate all rental real estate
interests, a taxpayer who meets the personal service requirements
of Sec. 469(c) (7), I.R.C. may not group a rental real estate
activity with any other activity of the taxpayer. For example if
a taxpayer develops real property and owns interests in rental
property, only the participation of the taxpayer with respect to
the rental real estate may be used to determine if the taxpayer
materially participates in the rental real estate activity.
Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(e) (3).
4.

Treatment of Limited Partnership Interests

--

a.
If a taxpayer elects to treat all interests
in rental real estate as a single rental real estate activity,
and at least one interest in rental real estate is held by the
taxpayer as a limited partnership interest, the combined rental
real estate activity will be treated as a limited partnership
interest of the taxpayer for purposes of determining material
participation. Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(f) (1).
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b.
Thus, the taxpayer must establish material
participation in a rental real estate activity under one of the
three tests available to limited partners under Temp. Reg.
§1.469-5T(e) (2).
Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(f) (1).
c. However, if the taxpayer's share of gross
rental income from all of the taxpayer's limited partnership
interests in rental real estate is less than 10% of the
taxpayer's share of gross rental income from all of the
taxpayer's interests in rental real estate for the taxable year,
this rule will not apply and the taxpayer may determine material
participation under the seven tests listed in Temp. Reg. §1.4695T(a).
Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(f) (2).
5.
Election to Treat all Interests in Rental Real
Estate as a Single Rental Real Estate Activity -- If such an
election is made, it is binding for the taxable year in which it
is made and for all future years in which the taxpayer is also a
qualifying taxpayer. Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(g) (1).
a.

Making the Election --

A qualifying taxpayer

makes the election to treat all interests in rental real estate
as one activity by filing a statement with the taxpayer's
original income tax return for the taxable year. This statement
must contain a declaration that the taxpayer is a qualifying
taxpayer for the taxable year and is making the election pursuant
to Sec. 469(c) (7)(A), I.R.C. Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(g) (3).
b.

Revoking the Election -- A taxpayer may

revoke the election if there is a material change in the
taxpayer's facts and circumstances. To revoke the election, the
taxpayer must file a statement with the taxpayer's original
income tax return for that year. This statement must contain a
declaration that the taxpayer is revoking the election under Sec.
469(c) (7)(A), I.R.C., and an explanation of the nature of the
material change. Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(g) (3).
6.

Interests Held through Pass-through Entities --

A

taxpayer's interest in rental real estate held by a partnership
or an S corporation is treated as a single interest in rental
real estate if the pass-through entity grouped its rental real
estate as one rental activity under Reg. §1.469-4(d) (5) unless a
qualifying taxpayer holds a 50% or greater interest in the
capital, income, gains, losses, deductions or credits of the
pass-through entity at any time during the taxable year, in which
case each interest in rental real estate held by the pass-through
entity will be treated as a separate interest in rental real
estate of the qualifying taxpayer, regardless of the pass-through
entity's grouping of activities.. Prop. Reg. §1.469-9(h).
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7.

Fresh Starts Under Consistency Rules --

a.
For the first taxable year in which a
taxpayer determines its tax liability under Prop. Reg. §1.469-4,
the taxpayer may regroup his or her activities without regard to
the manner in which the activities were grouped in the preceding
taxable year and must regroup his or her activities if his or her
prior grouping was inconsistent with the Proposed Regulation.
Prop. Reg. §1.469-11(b) (3)(i).
b.
For the first taxable year in which a
taxpayer determines his or her tax liability under Reg. §1.469-4,
the taxpayer may regroup his or her activities without regard to
the manner in which the activities were grouped in the preceding
taxable year and must regroup his or her activities if his or her
prior grouping was inconsistent with the rules of Reg. §1.469-4.
Prop. Reg. §1.469-11(b) (3) (ii).
c.
For the first taxable year beginning after
December 31, 1993, a taxpayer may regroup his or her activities
to the extent necessary or appropriate to avail himself or
herself of the provisions of Sec. 469(c) (7), I.R.C. and without
regard to the manner in which the activities were grouped in the
preceding taxable year. Prop. Reg. §1.469-11(b) (3)(iii).
D.

Sec. 701, I.R.C. (Subchapter K Anti-abuse Rules).

1.
Effective Date -- On May 17, 1994, the Service
promulgated Proposed Regulations relating to partnerships and the
abuse of them. On January 3, 1995, final Regulations were
promulgated. With the exception of the abuse of entity treatment
rule of Reg. §1.701-2(e), which is effective for all transactions
involving a partnership that occur on or after December 29, 1994,
the Regulation is effective for all transactions involving a
partnership that occur on or after May 12, 1994. Reg. §1.7012(g).
2.

Intent of Subchapter K -- The intent of the

partnership provisions in Subchapter K is to permit taxpayers to
conduct business for joint economic profit through a flexible
arrangement that accurately reflects the partners' economic
agreement without incurring an entity-level tax. Implicit in
this intent are the following three requirements:
a.
the partnership must be bona fide and each
partnership transaction (or series of related transactions) must
be entered into for a substantial business purpose;
b.
the form of each partnership transaction must
be respected under substance over form principles; and
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c.
the tax consequences under Subchapter K to
each partner must accurately reflect the partners' economic
agreement and clearly reflect the partners' income, except to the
extent that a provision of Subchapter K which is intended to
promote administrative convenience or other policy objectives
causes tax results that deviate from that requirement. Reg.
§1.701-2(a).
3.

Application of Subchapter K Rules -- If a

partnership is formed or availed of in connection with a
transaction or series of related transactions with a principal
purpose of substantially reducing the present value of the
partners' aggregate Federal tax liability in a manner that is
inconsistent with the intent of Subchapter K, the Commissioner
can recast the transaction even if the taxpayer complies with the
literal language of one or more of the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code or the Regulations thereunder. The Commissioner can
recast the transaction by (a) disregarding in whole or in part a
purported partnership; (b) treating one or more of the purported
partners as not a partner; (c) adjusting the methods of
accounting used by the partnership or a partner; (d) reallocating
a partnership's items of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit;
or (e) adjusting or otherwise modifying the claimed tax
treatment. Reg. §1.701-2(b).
a.

Test -- The purposes for structuring a

transaction involving a partnership will be determined based on
all of the facts and circumstances. Reg. §1.701-2(c).
Factors
which will be examined include:
(1) A comparison of the purported business
purpose for a transaction and the claimed tax benefits resulting
from the transaction;
(2) Whether the present value of the
partners' aggregate Federal tax liability is substantially less
than had the partners owned the partnership's assets and
conducted the partnership's activities directly;
(3) Whether the present value of the
partners' aggregate Federal tax liability is substantially less
than would be the case if purportedly separate transactions that
are designed to achieve a particular end result are integrated
and treated as steps in a single transaction;
(4) Whether one or more partners who are
necessary to achieve the claimed tax results either have a
nominal interest in the partnership, are substantially protected
from any risk of loss from the partnership's activities, or have
little or no participation in the profits from the partnership's
activities, other than a preferred return that is in the nature
of a payment for the use of capital;
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(5) Whether substantially all of the
partners are related to one another;
(6) Whether partnership items are allocated
in compliance with the literal language of Regs. §§1.704-1 and
1.704-2 but with results that are inconsistent with the purpose
of Sec. 704(b), I.R.C. and those Regulations;
(7) Whether the benefits and burdens of
ownership of property nominally contributed to the partnership
are in substantial part retained by the contributing partner; or
(8) Whether the benefits and burdens or
ownership of partnership property are in substantial part shifted
to the distributee partner before or after the property is
actually distributed to the distributee partner.
b.
In contrast to the Proposed Regulations, the
final Regulations give several examples of transactions
consistent with the intent of Subchapter K. Following is a
listing of the examples which are consistent with the intent:
§1.701-2(d),
requirements.

(1) Avoidance of entity-level tax.
Example 1.

Reg.

(2) Avoidance of Subchapter S shareholder
Reg. §1.701-2(d), Example 2.

(3) Avoidance of a more restrictive foreign
tax credit limitation. Reg. §1.701-2(d), Example 3.
(4) Avoidance of gain recognition under
Secs. 351(e) and 357(c), I.R.C. Reg. §1.701-2(d), Example 4.
(5) Special allocations to take advantage of
dividends received deductions, nonrecourse financing and lowincome housing credit. Reg. §1.701-2(d), Examples 7 and 8.
(6) Absence of Sec. 754, I.R.C. election.
Reg. §1.701-2(d), Example 11.
(7) Basis adjustments under Sec. 732, I.R.C.
Reg. §1.701-2(d), Example 12.
Following is a listing of the examples which
c.
with
the intent of Subchapter K:
are not consistent
(1) Use of both a temporary partner and a
nominal partner to generate artificial losses and shelter income
for a third partner. Reg. §1.701-2(d), Example 9.
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(2) Through the absence of a Sec. 754,
I.R.C. election, using a partnership to duplicate built-in loss
present in the asset prior to contribution. Reg. §1.701-2(d),
Example 10.
(3) Using basis adjustments under Sec. 732,
I.R.C. to allow a person to acquire and hold land but recover a
substantial portion of the purchase price.
Reg. §1.701-2(d),
Example 13.
4.

Abuse of Entity Treatment -- The Commissioner can

treat a partnership as an aggregate of its partners in whole or
in part as appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision
of the Internal Revenue Code or the Regulations promulgated
thereunder. Reg. §1.701-2(e).
However, the Commissioner does
not have that authority if:
a.
A provision of the Internal Revenue Code or
the Regulations promulgated thereunder prescribes the treatment
of a partnership as an entity, in whole or in part, and that
treatment and the ultimate tax results, taking into account all
the relevant facts and circumstances, are clearly contemplated by
that provision.
I.R.C.

b.
See as examples Secs. 163(e) (5) and 1059,
Reg. §1.701-2(f).
5.

Application of This Regulation -- When an issue

that may be affected by this Regulation is considered on
examination, any application of the Regulation must be
coordinated with both the Issue Specialist on the Partnership
Industry Specialization Program team and the IRS National Office.
Ann. 94-87, 1994-27 I.R.B. 124.
6.
Application of Regulation Solely to Income Tax -When the Regulation originally came out in final form, the
Regulation was to be applied to the operation and interpretation
of any provision of the Code and the Regulations thereunder that
might be relevant to a particular partnership transaction
(including income, estate, gift, generation-skipping and excise
tax).
However, the Service has changed its mind, and the
Regulation will affect only the income tax. Two examples
regarding family partnerships and gift tax have been removed.
Ann. 95-8, 1995-7 I.R.B. 56.
E.
Sec. 704, I.R.C. (Distribution of Contributed
Property).
1.
Effective Date -- On January 9, 1995, the Service
promulgated Proposed Regulations relating to the recognition of a
partner's Sec. 704(c) (1)(B), I.R.C. gain if another partner
receives a distribution of that property within five years of its
1615CS90.2H
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contribution to the partnership, on or after January 9, 1995.
Prop. Reg. §1.704-4(g).
2.

General Rule -- A partner that contributes Sec.

704(c), I.R.C. property to a partnership, which property is
distributed to another partner within five years of its
contribution to the partnership, must recognize gain or loss as
if the distributed property had been sold to the distributee
partner for fair market value. Prop. Reg. §1.704-4(a) (1).
a.
The five-year period begins on and includes
the date of contribution. However, a termination under Sec.
708(b) (1) (B), I.R.C. begins a new five-year period, but only to
the extent that the pre-termination built-in gain or loss, if
any, on such property was not already required to be allocated to
the original contributor. Prop. Reg. §1.704-4(a) (4).
b.
The character of the gain recognized under
Sec. 704(c) (1)(B), I.R.C. is the same as would have resulted if
the distributed property had been sold to the distributee partner
by the partnership. Prop. Reg. §1.704-4(b) (1).
3.
Transactions Which Are Exempted from Section -Sec. 704(c) (1)(B), I.R.C. does not apply to the following
transactions:
a.
Property contributed to the partnership on or
before October 3, 1989;
b.
A distribution of an interest in the
distributed property in a complete liquidation of the partnership
if the contributing partner receives an interest in the property
and the built-in gain or loss in the interest distributed to the
contributing partner, determined immediately after the
distribution, is equal to or greater than the built-in gain or
loss on the property that would have been allocated to the
contributing partner; and
c.
A deemed distribution of property caused by a
termination of the partnership under Sec. 708(b) (1)(B), I.R.C.
Prop. Reg. §1.704-4(c).
4.

Anti-Abuse Rule -- The Commissioner can recast a

transaction for Federal tax purposes as appropriate to achieve
tax results that are consistent with the purposes of Sec.
704(c) (1) (B), I.R.C. Prop. Reg. §1.704-4(f).
F.
Sec. 704(c), I.R.C. (Allocations on Contributions to
Partnerships).
1.
Promulgation -- On December 28, 1994, the Service
promulgated final Regulations under Sec. 704(c),
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to the remedial allocation method (a reasonable method of
allocation with respect to property contributed by a partner to a
partnership) and a special aggregation rule with respect to
securities partnerships.
2.

Overview -- In the Proposed Regulations

promulgated on December 24, 1992, the Service included the
deferred sale method as a reasonable allocation method. After
receiving many comments, the Service determined that the results
of the deferred sales method could be achieved using a less
complex method. The Service also received several comments on
the impracticability of making reverse Sec. 704(c) allocations on
an asset-by-asset basis for securities partnerships. Because
aggregation did not significantly increase the potential for
abusive transactions, the Service agreed that aggregation would
be allowed in such circumstances.
3.

Remedial Allocation Method -- Reg. §1.704-3(d)

sets forth the remedial allocation method for making Sec. 704(c)
allocations.
a.
Remedial allocations are tax allocations of
income or gain that are offset by tax allocations of loss or
deduction. These tax allocations have no effect on the
partnership's book capital accounts. Reg. §1.704-3(d) (4).
b.
The first step is for the partnership to
determine the amount of book items. Under Reg. §1.704-3(d) (2),
the partnership determines the amount of book items in the
following manner, rather than under the rules of Reg. §1.7041(b) (2)(iv) ( ) (3):
(1) The portion of the book basis which is
equal to the tax basis is recovered in the same manner as it is
recovered for tax purposes.
(2) The portion of
in excess of the tax basis is recovered
recovery period and depreciation method
partnership at the time the property is

the book basis which is
using any applicable
available to the
contributed.

c.
The second step is determining the
distributive share of these items under Sec. 704(b), I.R.C. Then
the partnership makes tax allocations using the traditional
method. If the ceiling rule results in a book allocation to a
noncontributing partner different from the tax allocation, the
partnership makes a remedial allocation of income, gain, loss or
deduction to the noncontributing partner equal to the full amount
of the ceiling rule limitation and a simultaneous offsetting
allocation to the contributing partner. Reg. §1.704-3(d) (1).
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The remedial allocation must have the same
d.
effect on each partner's tax liability as the tax item limited by
the ceiling rule. Reg. §1.704-3(d) (3).
e.
If a partnership's allocation method is not
reasonable, the Service will not require the partnership to use
the remedial allocation method. Reg. §1.704-3(d) (5)(ii).
f.
The remedial allocation method is the only
reasonable Sec. 704(c) method which creates notional tax items.
Reg. §1.704-3(d) (5) (i)
4.

Special AQQreqation Rule for Securities

Partnerships -- For purposes of making reverse Sec. 704(c),

I.R.C. allocations, a securities partnership may aggregate gains
and losses from qualified financial assets using any reasonable
approach that is consistent with the purpose of Sec. 704(c),
I.R.C. Once a partnership adopts an aggregate approach, that
partnership must apply the same aggregate approach to all of its
qualified financial assets for all taxable years in which the
partnership qualifies as a securities partnership. Reg. 91.7043(e)(i).
A partnership using an aggregate approach
a.
must separately account for any built-in gain or loss from
contributed property. Reg. §1.704-3(e) (i).
A qualified financial asset is any personal
b.
property that is actively traded. Reg. §1.704-3(e) (ii) (A).
c.
A partnership is a securities partnership if
the partnership is either a management company or an investment
partnership, and the partnership makes all of its book
allocations in proportion to the partners' relative book capital
accounts.
d.
The Regulation details two reasonable methods
for aggregating reverse Sec. 704(c), I.R.C. gains and losses:
the partial netting approach and the full netting approach.
Regs. §§1.704-3(e) (iv), (v).
G.

Sec. 737, I.R.C. (RecoQnition of Precontribution Gain).

1.
Effective Date -- On January 9, 1995, the Service
promulgated Proposed Regulations relating to the recognition of
the partner's precontribution gain if that partner receives a
distribution of property (other than money) on or after
January 9, 1995. Prop. Reg. §1.737-5.
2.

General Rule -- A partner that receives a

distribution of property (other than money) must recognize gain
under Sec. 737, I.R.C. in an amount equal to the lesser of (i)
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the excess distribution or (ii) the partner's net precontribution
gain. Prop. Reg. §1.737-1(a) (1).
a.

Excess Distribution -- The amount

(if any) by

which the fair market value of the distributed property exceeds
the distributee partner's adjusted tax basis in the partner's
partnership interest. Prop. Reg. §1.737-1(b) (1).
b.

Net Pre-Contribution Gain -- The net gain, if

any, that the partner would have recognized under Sec.
704(c) (1) (B), I.R.C. if, at the time of the distribution, the
partnership had distributed to another partner all the Sec.
704(c), I.R.C. property contributed to the partnership by the
distributee partner. Prop. Reg. §1.737-1(c) (1).
c.

Character of Gain -- The character of the

gain recognized under Sec. 737, I.R.C. is determined by, and is
proportionate to, the character of the partner's net
precontribution gain. Prop. Reg. §1.737-1(d).
3.
Transactions Which Are Exempted from Section -Sec. 737, I.R.C. does not apply to the following transactions:
a.

Sec. 708(b) (1)(B),

I.R.C. terminations;

b.
A transfer by a partnership of all of its
assets and liabilities to a second partnership followed by a
distribution of the interests in the second partnership in
complete liquidation of the first partnership; and
c.
An incorporation of a partnership.
Regs. §§1.737-2(a),(b) and (c).
4.

Prop.

Anti-Abuse Rule -- The Commissioner can recast a

transaction for Federal tax purposes as appropriate to achieve
tax results that are consistent with the purposes of Sec. 737,
I.R.C. Prop. Reg. §1.737-4(a).
H.
Sec. 1402, I.R.C. (Self-Employment Tax Treatment of
Members of Certain LLCs).
1.
Effective Date -- On December 29, 1994, the
Service issued Proposed Regulations dealing with the selfemployment status of members of certain LLCs. These Regulations
will be effective beginning with the member's first taxable year
beginning on or after the date-these Regulations are published as
final.
2.

General Rule -- Except as otherwise provided in

Sec. 1402(a), I.R.C., an individual's net earnings from selfemployment include the individual's distributive share of income
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or loss from any trade or business carried on by a LLC of which
the individual is a member. Prop. Reg. §l.1402(a)-18(a).
3.

Treatment as a Limited Partner --

Solely for

purposes of Sec. 1402(a) (13), I.R.C., a member of an LLC will be
treated as a limited partner only if:
a.

The member is not a manager of the LLC; and

b. The entity could have been formed as a limited
partnership rather than an LLC in the same jurisdiction, and the
member could have qualified as a limited partner under applicable
law. Prop. Reg. §1.1402(a)-18(b).
Sec. 6050H, I.R.C. (Information Reporting Requirements
I.
for Recipients of Points Paid on Residential Mortgages).
Effective Date -- On April 12, 1988, the Service
1.
released final Regulations regarding the application of Sec.
6050H, I.R.C. to amounts received as interest. On December 29,
1993, the Service issued final Regulations regarding
reimbursements of interest paid in connection with a qualified
mortgage. On December 8, 1994, the Service issued final
Regulations regarding information reporting requirements for
recipients of points paid on residential mortgages. With the
exception of the Regulation dealing with points, the Regulations
are effective for mortgage interest received after December 31,
1987. The reporting requirements do not apply to prepaid
interest received in the form of points before January 1, 1995.
Reg. §1.6050H-l(g).
2.

Reporting Requirement -- An interest recipient

that either receives at least $600 of interest on a qualified
mortgage for a calendar year or makes reimbursements of interest
must, with respect to that interest:
File an information return with the Internal
a.
Revenue Service; and
the mortgage.
3.

Furnish a statement to the payor of record of
b.
Reg. §1.6050H-l(a) (2).
Interest Recipient -- An interest recipient is a

person engaged in a trade or business and that, in the course of
the trade or business, either receives interest on a mortgage or
makes a reimbursement of interest on a qualified mortgage. Reg.
§1.6050H-1(c) (1).
A person that, in the course of its trade or
a.
business, receives or collects interest on a mortgage on behalf
of another person is the interest recipient for the mortgage
unless:
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(1) The initial recipient does not possess
the information needed to comply with the reporting requirement;
and
(2) The person for which the interest is
received or collected would receive the interest in the course of
its trade or business if the interest were paid directly to that
person. Reg. §1.6050H-l(c)(2).
b.
In the case of collection on behalf of
another person, the reporting requirement does not apply to the
transfer of interest from the initial recipient to the person for
whom the initial recipient receives or collects the interest.
Reg. §1.6050H-I(c) (2).
person is
agreement
case only
receiving
agreement

c.
Only the lender of record or a qualified
treated as receiving points unless a designation
is executed pursuant to Reg. §l.6050H-2(d), in which
the designated party under the agreement is treated as
points with respect to any mortgage to which the
applies. Reg. §1.6050H-l(c) (3).

(1) The written designation agreement must
identify the mortgage(s) and calendar year(s) for which the
designated qualified person must report, and must be signed by
both the designator and designee. Reg. §l.6050H-2(d) (3).
(2) A qualified person is a person who is
either:
(a) A trade or business with respect to
which the interest recipient is under common control, within the
meaning of Reg. §1.414(c)-2; or
(b) A person who is named as the
designee by the lender of record or by a qualified person, and
who either was involved in the original loan transaction or is a
subsequent purchaser of the loan. Reg. §1.6050H-2(d) (2).
(3)

Penalties -- A designated qualified

person is subject to any applicable penalties as if it were an
interest recipient. Reg. §1.6050H-2(d) (4).
4.

Interest -- Interest includes mortgage prepayment

penalties and late charges other than late charges for a specific
mortgage service. Also includes prepaid interest in the form of
points. Reg. §1.6050H-l(e) (1).
Note that the inclusion of
points in the determination of interest applies only to
transactions occurring after December 31, 1994. Reg. §1.6050H1(g) (2).
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5.

When Reported --

Interest is reported in the

later of the calendar year in which the interest is received or
the calendar year in which the interest properly accrues. Points
must be reported in the calendar year in which they are received.
Reg. §1.6050H-l(e) (2).
6.

Points --

a.
An amount is deemed to be points paid in
respect of indebtedness incurred in connection with the purchase
of the payor of record's principal residence to the extent that
the amount:
(2) Is clearly designated on the Uniform
Settlement Statement prescribed under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974 (e.g., the Form HUD-1);
(2) Is computed as a percentage of the
stated principal amount of the indebtedness incurred by the payor
of record;
(3) Conforms to an established practice of
charging points in the area in which the loan is issued and does
not exceed the amount generally charged in the area;
(4) Is in connection with the acquisition by
the payor of record of a residence that is the principal
residence of the payor of record and that secures the loan; and
(5)

Is paid directly by the payor of record,

which occurs if payment is --

(a) Provided by the payor of record
from funds that have not been borrowed from the lender of record
for this purpose as part of the overall transaction; or
(b) Paid as points.

Reg. §1.6050H-

1(f)(3).
b.
Similar requirements must be met to treat
amounts paid in connection with indebtedness incurred to
construct a residence, or to refinance indebtedness incurred to
construct a residence, as points. Reg. §1.6050H-l(f) (4).
c.
Amounts received directly or indirectly by a
mortgage broker are treated as-points to the same extent the
amounts would be so treated if they were paid to the lender of
record. Reg. §1.6050H-l(f) (5).

1615cS9o.2H

-

25

-

A29

J.

Sec. 7701, I.R.C. (Environmental Remediation Trusts).

1.
Effective Date -- On August 3, 1995, the Service
issued Proposed Regulations which provide guidance on the proper
classification of trusts formed to collect and disburse amounts
for environmental remediation of an existing waste site. These
Regulations will be applicable to trusts formed on or after the
date of their publication as final. Prop. Reg. §301.77014(e) (5).
2.

Environmental Remediation Trusts -- An

organization is an "environmental remediation trust" if:
a.

The organization is organized under state law

as a trust;
b.
Its primary purpose is the collection and
disbursement of amounts for environmental remediation of an
existing waste site in order to resolve, satisfy, mitigate,
address or prevent the liability or potential liability of
persons imposed by environmental laws;
c.
All contributors to the trust have potential
liability or a reasonable expectation of liability under
environmental laws for environmental remediation of the waste
site; and
§1.468B-l(a).
3.

d.
Is not a qualified settlement fund under Reg.
Prop. Reg. §301.7701-4(e) (1).
Environmental Remediation -- It includes the costs

of assessing environmental conditions, remediating environmental
contamination, monitoring remedial activities and the release of
substances, preventing future releases of substances and
collecting amounts from persons liable or potentially liable for
the costs of these activities. Prop. Reg. §301.7701-4(e) (1).
4.

Treatment -- Each contributor to the trust will be

treated as the owner of that portion of the trust contributed by
that grantor. Prop. Reg. §301.7701-4(e) (2).
5.

Trustee Responsibilities -- The trustee must

furnish to each grantor a statement that shows all tax items
attributable to the portion of the trust treated as owned by that
grantor. In addition, the statement must provide all information
necessary to take into account-items under the economic
performance rules of Sec. 461(h), I.R.C. Prop. Reg. §301.77014(e)(2).
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6.

Cash-out Grantor Rules --

a.
All amounts contributed to an environmental
remediation trust by a grantor who, pursuant to an agreement with
the other grantors, contributes a fixed amount to the trust and
is relieved of any further obligation to make contributions to
the trust, but remains liable or potentially liable under the
applicable environmental laws, will be considered amounts
contributed for remediation. Prop. Reg. §301.7701-4(e) (3).
An environmental remediation trust agreement
b.
may direct the trustee to expend amounts contributed by a cashout grantor (and the earnings thereon) before expending amounts
Prop.
contributed by other grantors (and the earnings thereon).
Reg. §301.7701-4(e) (3).
A cash-out grantor will cease to be treated
c.
as an owner of a portion of-the trust when the grantor's portion
is fully expended by the trust. Prop. Reg. §301.7701-4(e) (3).
Sec. 7704(b),
K.
Partnership).

I.R.C. (Definition of Publicly Traded

Effective Date -- On May 2, 1995, the Service
1.
issued Proposed Regulation §1.7704-1 relating to the definition
of-publicly traded partnership. These Proposed Regulations will
apply for taxable years beginning on or after the date the final
Regulations are published. Prop. Reg. §1.7704-1(k). Until that
time, Notice 88-75, 1988-2 C.B. 386 continues to apply.
2.

Definition -- A publicly traded partnership is one

whose partnership interests ate traded on:
a.

An established securities market -- Such a

market includes (i) a national securities exchange registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (ii) a national
securities exchange exempt from registration because of the
limited volume of transactions; (iii) a foreign securities
exchange; (iv) a regional or local exchange; and (v) an
interdealer quotation system that regularly disseminates firm buy
or sell quotations by identified brokers or dealers by electronic
means or otherwise. Prop. Reg. §1.7704-1(b).
b.

A secondary market -- Such a market exists

where (i) interests are regularly quoted by any person making a
market in the interest or (ii) any person regularly makes
available to the public bid or offer quotes with respect to
interests in the partnership and stands ready to effect buy or
sell transactions at the quoted prices for itself or on behalf of
Prop. Reg. §1.7704-1(c) (2).
others (firm-quote trading).
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c.

The substantial eauivalent of a secondary

market -- Such a market exists where (i) the holder of an

interest has a readily available, regular and ongoing opportunity
to sell or exchange the interest through a public means of
obtaining or providing information of offers to buy, sell or
exchange interests or (ii) prospective buyers and sellers have
the opportunity to buy, sell or exchange interests with the
regularity and continuity that the existence of a secondary
market would provide. Prop. Reg. §1.7704-1(c) (3).
3.

Transfers Taken into Account -- A transfer is

taken into account only if: (i) the partnership redeems the
interest; (ii) the transferee is admitted as a partner; or (iii)
the partnership otherwise recognizes any rights of the
transferee. Prop. Reg. §1.7704-1(a) (4).
4.

Transfers DisreQarded (Private Transfers) --

a.
Transfers in which the basis of the
partnership interest in the hands of the transferee is determined
by reference to the its basis in the hands of transferor or is
determined under Sec. 732, I.R.C;
b.

Transfers at death;

Transfers between family members (as defined
c.
in Sec. 267(c) (4), I.R.C.;
d.
Transfers involving the issuance of interests
by (or on behalf of) the partnership in exchange for cash,
property or services;
e.
Transfers involving distributions from a
qualified retirement plan or IRA;
f.
The transfer by a partner within a 30-day
period of interests representing in the aggregate more than 2% of
the total interests in capital or profits (a "block transfer");
g.
Transfers pursuant to a redemption or
repurchase agreement which is exercisable only in certain limited
circumstances (such as the disability or mental incompetence, or
retirement or termination of services, of the partner);
h.

Transfers pursuant to a closed-end redemption

plan; and
Transfers by one or more partners of
i.
interests representing more than 50% of the total interests in
partnership capital and profits in one transaction or series of
related transactions. Prop. Reg. §1.7704-1(d) (1).
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5.
DisreQard of Transfers Pursuant to Redemption and
Repurchase Agreements -- Transfers pursuant to redemption or
repurchase agreements not described above will be disregarded for
purposes of determining the existence of a secondary market or a
substantial equivalent thereof if:
During the taxable year, transfers do not
a.
exceed 10% of the total interests in partnership capital or
profits;
Written notification is given to the
b.
partnership (or a partner or agent thereof) by the transferor
partner at least 60 days before the partner intends to exercise
the right; and
Either the redemption or repurchase price is
c.
not established until at least 60 days after receipt of this
notification or this price is established not more than four
times a year. Prop. Reg. §1.7704-1(e).
6.
Disregard of Transfers Pursuant to a Qualified
Matching Service -- Transfers pursuant to a qualified matching
service will be disregarded for purposes of determining the
existence of a secondary market or a substantial equivalent
thereof. Prop. Reg. §1.7704-1(f).
7.

Private Placements -- Partnership interests will

not be treated as readily tradeable on the substantial equivalent
of a secondary market if:
All interests were issued in a transaction
a.
that was not required to be registered under the Securities Act
of 1933;
If the partnership has more than 50 partners
b.
at any time during its taxable year, the percentage transferred
(other than in private transfers) cannot exceed 10%; and
c.
Either the partnership has 500 or less
partners or the initial offering price of each unit of
partnership interest is at least $20,000. Prop. Reg. §1.77041(g).
8.

Lack of Actual TradinQ -- Partnership interests

will not be treated as readily tradeable on the substantial
equivalent of a secondary market if the percentage transferred
during a taxable year (other than in private transfers, pursuant
to redemption or repurchase agreements, or pursuant to a
qualified matching service) does not exceed 2%. Prop. Reg.
§1.7704-1(h).
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III.

REVENUE

PROCEDURES AND I.R.S.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

A.
Rev. Proc. 94-49 (Change of Accounting Method for
Uniform Capitalization Rules. In Rev. Proc. 94-49,,1994-2 C.B.
705, the Service provided a mechanism for a taxpayer
automatically to obtain the consent of the Commissioner to change
its method of accounting to a method required or permitted by
Regs. §§1.263A-1, -2 and -3 for the first taxable year beginning
on or after January 1, 1994.
The Procedure cannot be used to make the following changes:
1.
For purposes of determining Sec. 471, I.R.C. costs
under one of the simplified accounting methods;
2.
For electing the historic absorption ratio under
the simplified production method or the simplified resale method;
3.
If the taxpayer is required to change accounting
methods to comply with Section 263A, I.R.C. for the first time;
4.
If the taxpayer is changing its method because it
qualifies as a "small reseller" or no longer qualifies as a
"small reseller";
5.
If a request to change method was filed for a
prior taxable year and the taxpayer withdrew the request, failed
to sign or failed to implement the change;
6.
If the taxpayer has a Sec. 263A, I.R.C. issue
pending on June 28, 1994 and it is being considered by the
District Director in an examination, an Appeals officer or any
Federal court; or
7.
If the taxpayer is the subject of a pending
criminal investigation relating to tax liability.
B.
Rev. Proc. 95-10 (Classification of a Domestic or
Foreign LLC).
In Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20, the Service
specified the conditions under which it will consider a ruling
request that relates to classification of a domestic or foreign
LLC as a partnership for Federal income tax purposes. Rev. Proc.
89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, will no longer apply to LLCs.
1.
This Revenue Procedure applies to all
organizations that are formed as LLCs under domestic law.
a.
It also applies to all organizations formed
under foreign law where the foreign law provides for, or allows,
limited liability to any of their members (whether or not the
foreign organization is "incorporated" under a foreign statute).
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b.
This Revenue Procedure does not apply to a
publicly traded LLC treated as a corporation under Sec. 7704,
I.R.C.
2.
In submitting a request, all of the information in
Rev. Proc. 94-1, 1994-1 C.B. 378, is required, as well as the
following supplementary information:
a.
The name and taxpayer identification number,
if any, of the LLC;
b.

The business of the LLC;

c.
The date and place of filing of the LLC's
articles of organization, or the anticipated date and place of
filing;
d.
The identification of the domestic or foreign
jurisdiction the law of which controls the formation and
operation of the LLC;
e.
A representation that the LLC has been, and
will be at all times, in conformance with the controlling laws of
the domestic or foreign jurisdiction;
f.
The nature, amount and timing of capital
contributions made, and to be made, by the members of the LLC;
g.
The extent of participation of the members
and the managers in profits and losses of the LLC, including any
possible shift in the profit and loss sharing ratios over time;
h.
A description of the relationships, direct
and indirect, between the members and the managers that would
suggest that the managers, individually or in the aggregate, may
not at all times act independently of the members. This may also
include a debtor-creditor relationship and an employer-employee
relationship. These relationships definitely include:
(1) ownership by non-manager members of 5%
or more of the stock or other beneficial interests in a manager;
(2) control by non-manager members of 5% or
more of the voting power in a manager;
(3) ownership of 5% or more of the stock or
other beneficial interests in any manager and in any non-manager
members by the same person or persons acting as a group; and
(4) control of 5% or more of the voting
power in any manager and in any non-manager members by the same
person or persons acting as a group.
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i.
If it is asserted that the LLC lacks the
corporate characteristic of limited liability -(1) a description of the legal arrangements
supporting the assertion that the LLC lacks limited liability;
(2) a representation of the net worth of the
member or members assuming personal liability for all obligations
of the LLC;
(3) a description of the assuming member's
or members' assets and liabilities arising from transactions with
the LLC or with a person related to any member or members under
Sec. 267(b) or 707(b) (1), I.R.C.; and
(4) a description of all other organizations
in which the member or members have an interest.
j.
If the Service has issued a revenue ruling on
the applicable domestic or foreign law, a discussion of how the
revenue ruling applies to the taxpayer's ruling request.
3.
Under Section 4.01, the Service will consider a
ruling request only if the LLC has at least two members and, to
the extent applicable, the conditions of the Revenue Procedure
are satisfied.
Section 4.02 sets forth the general rule regarding
4.
profit and loss interests in a LLC. It states that if a taxpayer
requests a ruling that the LLC lacks continuity of life or free
transferability of interests, the member-managers must own,
pursuant to the express terms of the operating agreement, at
least a 1% interest, in the aggregate, in each material item of
the LLC's income, gain, loss, deduction or credit during the
entire existence of the LLC.
a.
Temporary allocations, other than allocations
under Sec. 704(b) or 704(c), I.R.C., will be considered a
violation unless the LLC clearly establishes in the ruling
request that the member-managers or the assuming members have a
material interest in net profits and losses over the LLC's
anticipated life.
b.
A profits interest will not be considered
material unless it substantially exceeds 1% and will be in effect
for a substantial period of time during which the LLC reasonably
expects to generate profits.
The exception to. this general rule is stated in
5.
Section 4.03. It states that if the LLC has total contributions
exceeding $50 million, the member-managers need not meet the 1%
standard in Sec. 4.02. However, the member-managers (or assuming
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members), in the aggregate, must maintain an interest at all
times during the existence of the LLC in each material item of at
least 1% divided by the ratio of total contributions to $50
million, and the LLC's operating agreement must expressly
incorporate at least the computed percentage.
Section 4.04 contains the general rule regarding
6.
capital account balances. It states that if a taxpayer'requests
a ruling that the LLC lacks continuity of life or free
transferability of interests, the member-managers, in the
aggregate, must maintain throughout the entire existence of the
LLC a minimum capital account balance equal to the lesser of 1%
of total positive capital account balances or $500,000. If no
member has a positive capital account balance, then the membermanagers (or assuming members) in the LLC need not have a
positive capital account balance.
The exception to this general rule is stated in
7.
Section 4.05. It states that if at least one member-manager has
contributed or will contribute substantial services in the
capacity as a member, apart from services for which guaranteed
payments under Sec. 707(c), I.R.C. are made, the capital account
standard in Section 4.04 does not apply to any of the membermanagers. Services that do not relate to day-to-day operations
in the LLC's primary business activity will be closely
scrutinized by the Service to determine if they are in fact
substantial services.
In Section 5, the Service outlines the ruling
8.
guidelines for specific corporate characteristics, as follows:
a.

Continuity of Life -- Unless the LLC is

continued by the consent of not less than a majority in interest
of the remaining members, the Service will generally rule that
the LLC lacks continuity of life. Rev. Proc. 94-46, 1994-2 C.B.
688, defines majority in interest. If the controlling statute or
the operating agreement does not provide that death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation and expulsion of any member
dissolves the LLC, the Service will not rule that the LLC lacks
continuity of life unless the taxpayer clearly establishes that
the event or events selected provide a meaningful possibility of
dissolution.
b.

Free Transferability of Interests -- The

Service will generally rule that the LLC lacks free
transferability of interests if each member, or those members
owning more than 20% of all interests in the LLC's capital,
income, gains, losses, deductions and credits, do not have the
power to confer upon a non-member all the attributes of the
member's interests in the LLC without the consent of not less
than a majority of the non-transferring members. The Service
will not rule that the LLC lacks free transferability of
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interests unless the power to withhold consent to the transfer
constitutes a meaningful restriction on the transfer of the
interests.
c.

Centralization of Manacrement

-- If the

controlling statute or the operating agreement provides that the
LLC is managed by the members exclusively in their membership
capacity, the Service generally will rule that the LLC lacks
centralized management. However, if the LLC is managed by
member-managers, the Service will not rule that the LLC lacks
centralized management unless the member-managers in the
aggregate own at least 20% of the total interests in the LLC.
The Service will consider all the relevant facts and
circumstances, including, particularly, member control of the
member-managers (whether direct or indirect), in determining
whether the LLC lacks centralized management. The Service will
not rule that the LLC lacks centralized management if the membermanagers are subject to periodic elections by the members, or,
alternatively, the non-managing members have a substantially nonrestricted power to remove the member-managers.
d.

Limited Liability --

The Service generally

will not rule that an LLC lacks limited liability unless at least
one member validly assumes personal liability for all'(but not
less than all) obligations of the LLC. The Service generally
will not rule that an LLC lacks limited liability unless the
assuming members have an aggregate net worth that, at the time of
the ruling request, equals at least 10% of the total
contributions to the LLC and is expected to continue to equal at
least 10% of total contributions to the LLC throughout the life
of the LLC.
C.
Rev. Proc. 95-27 (Demolition under Sec. 280B).
Rev.
Proc. 95-27, 1995-23 I.R.B. 11, was issued to provide a safe
harbor for certain structural modifications which will not be
treated as a demolition for purposes of Sec. 280B, I.R.C.
1.
A modification of a building, other than a
certified historic structure, will not be treated as a demolition
for purposes of Sec 280B, I.R.C. if (1) 75% or more of the
existing external walls of the building are retained in place as
internal or external walls, and (2) 75% or more of the existing
internal structural framework of the building is retained in
place.
2.
A modification of a certified historic structure
will not be treated as a demolition for purposes of Sec. 280B,
I.R.C. if (1) the modification is part of a certified
rehabilitation, (2) 75% or more of the existing external walls of
the building are retained in place as internal or external walls,
and (3) 75% or more of the existing internal structure framework
of the building is retained in place.
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3.
This Revenue Procedure is effective for
modifications commencing after June 5, 1995, but, at the option
of the taxpayer, the Revenue Procedure may be treated as
effective for any open taxable years.
IV.

REVENUE RULINGS AND NOTICES

A.
Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. This Revenue Ruling
deals with the issue of whether the costs incurred to clean up
land and to treat groundwater that a taxpayer contaminated with
hazardous waste in the operations of its business are deductible
by the taxpayer as business expenses under Sec. 162, I.R.C. or
must be capitalized under Sec. 263, I.R.C.
FACTS:

X built a plant on land that it had purchased in 1970. The
land was not contaminated by hazardous waste when it was
purchased. X's manufacturing operations discharge hazardous
waste. In the past, X buried this waste on portions of its land.
In 1993, in order to comply with presently applicable and
reasonably anticipated federal, state and local environmental
requirements, X decided to remediate the soil and groundwater
that had been contaminated by the hazardous waste, and to
establish an appropriate system for the continued monitoring of
the groundwater.
X began excavating the contaminated soil, transporting it to
appropriate waste disposal facilities, and backfilling the
excavated areas with uncontaminated soil. X also began
constructing groundwater treatment facilities which included
wells, pipes, pumps, and other equipment to extract, treat and
monitor contaminated groundwater. The effect of the soil
remediation and groundwater treatment will be to restore X's land
to essentially the same physical condition that existed prior to
the contamination. X will continue to use the land and operate
the plant in the same manner as it did prior to the cleanup
except that X will dispose of any hazardous waste in compliance
with environmental requirements.
ANALYSIS:

The Code generally endeavors to match expenses with the
revenues of the taxable period to which the expenses are properly
attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of
net income for tax purposes.
The groundwater treatment facilities constructed by X have a
useful life substantially beyond the taxable year in which they
are constructed and, thus, the costs of their construction are
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capital expenditures under Sec. 263(a), I.R.C. The costs of
these facilities are recoverable under applicable law.
X's soil remediation expenditures and ongoing groundwater
treatment expenditures do not produce permanent improvements to
X's land within the scope of Reg. §1.263-(a) (1) or otherwise
provide significant future benefits. See Plainfield-Union Water
Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 333 (1962), nonacg. on other grounds,
1964-2 C.B. 8. X's soil remediation and ongoing groundwater
treatment expenditures do not result in improvements that
increase the value of X's property because X has merely restored
its soil and groundwater to their approximate condition before
they were contaminated by X's manufacturing operations.
These expenditures do not prolong the useful life of the land,
nor do they adapt the land to a new or different use. Moreover,
since the land is not subject to an allowance for depreciation,
amortization, or depletion, the amounts expended to restore the
land to its original condition are not subject to capitalization.
The soil remediation and ongoing groundwater treatment
expenditures incurred by X represent ordinary and necessary
business expenses within the scope of Sec. 162, I.R.C. They are
appropriate and helpful in carrying on X's business and are
commonly and frequently required in X's type of business.
These results are applicable whether the taxpayer plans to
continue its manufacturing operations that discharge the
hazardous waste or to discontinue those manufacturing operations
and hold the land in an idle state.
Furthermore, Rev. Rul. 88-58, 1988-2 C.B. 36, is modified to
the extent it implies that the value test applied by the Court in
Plainfield-Union cannot be an appropriate test in any case other
than one in which there is sudden and unanticipated damage to an
asset.
B.
Rev. Rul. 94-79, 1994-2 C.B. 409. This Ruling provides
guidance on whether a Connecticut limited liability company will
be classified as an association or a partnership.
The fact pattern illustrated an LLC with 25 members, 3 of
which had been elected managers under the articles of
organization. Under the Connecticut LLC Act and the LLC's
operating agreement, unless there were at least two remaining
members and the business of the LLC was continued by the consent
of the remaining members owning a majority of the profits
interests and capital interests, the LLC was dissolved upon the
death, incompetency, withdrawal, removal, bankruptcy or
dissolution of a member or the occurrence of any other event that
terminated the continued membership of a member. Under the
Connecticut LLC Act, the members and managers of an LLC are not
liable for debts, obligations or liabilities of the LLC, whether
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arising in contract, tort or otherwise, or for the acts or
omissions of any other member, manager, agent or employee of the
LLC. In addition, if the LLC provided professional services, the
members would not be liable for the debts of, or claims against,
the LLC, but would only have personal liability in connection
with the performance of professional services on behalf of the
LLC by themselves or by any person under their direct supervision
and control. Under the Connecticut LLC Act and the LLC's
operating agreement, a member could assign that member's interest
to another person who is not a member, but the assignee could not
become a member unless a majority in interest of the remaining
members approved the assignment.
Using Reg. §301.7701-2, the Service determined that this LLC
was classified as a partnership because, although it possessed
centralized management and limited liability, it lacked
continuity of life and free transferability of interests.
The Ruling noted that, because of the flexibility of the
Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, a Connecticut LLC
could be classified as a partnership or as an association
depending upon the provisions adopted in the LLC's articles of
organization or operating agreement.
For similar Rulings, see: Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233
(Delaware); Rev. Rul. 93-49, 1993-2 C.B. 308 (Illinois); Rev.
Rul. 93-81, 1993-2 C.B. 314 (Rhode Island); Rev. Rul. 93-91,
1993-2 C.B. 316 (Utah); Rev. Rul. 93-92, 1993-2 C.B. 18
(Oklahoma); Rev. Rul. 93-93, 1993-2 C.B. 321 (Arizona); Rev. Rul.
94-5, 1994-2 I.R.B. 21 (Louisiana); Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-3 I.R.B.
11 (Alabama); Rev. Rul. 94-30, 1994-19 I.R.B. 6 (Kansas); and
Rev. Rul. 94-51, 1994-32 I.R.B. 11 (New Jersey).
Rev. Rul. 95-2. 1995-1 I.R.B. 7. This Revenue Ruling
C.
provides a list of states whose adopted versions of the RULPA
have been determined by the Service to correspond to the ULPA, as
of Jan. 3, 1995, for the purposes of Reg. §301.7701-2
(classification of the entity as an association or as a
partnership for Federal income tax purposes). No opinion is
expressed if the statute has been amended after the effective
date cited in the Ruling. The list of states includes: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming.
Rev. Rul. 95-5. 1995-2 I.R.B. 5. This Ruling analyzes
D.
how either a partner or an S corporation stockholder who receives
a distribution in excess of basis should characterize the gain
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for purposes of the passive activity loss rules of Sec. 469,
I.R.C.
The Ruling holds that such gain is treated as gain from the
sale or exchange of the interest and is characterized pursuant to
Temp. Reg. §l.469-2T(e) (3) (ii) (A), which provides that, if a
holder of an interest in a pass-through entity disposes of its
interest, a ratable portion of any gain or loss from the
disposition is treated as gain or loss from the disposition of an
interest in each trade or business, rental activity, or
investment activity in which the pass-through entity owns an
interest.
E.
Rev. Rul. 95-37, 1995-17 I.R.B. 10. In this Ruling,
the Service issued guidance on the tax treatment of a conversion
from a domestic partnership to a domestic LLC which is classified
for Federal income tax purposes as a partnership. The Service
ruled that such a conversion is treated as a partnership-topartnership conversion. See Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157.
These consequences apply whether the resulting LLC is formed in
the same state or in a different state.
The partnership-to-LLC conversion does not cause a
termination under Sec. 708, I.R.C. Moreover, the conversion is
not a sale, exchange, or liquidation of the converting partner's
entire partnership interest for purposes of Sec. 706(c) (2) (A),
I.R.C.
The conversion does not cause the taxable year of the
domestic partnership to close with respect to all the partners or
with respect to any partner. The resulting LLC does not need a
new TIN.
The holdings contained in this Revenue Ruling apply in a
similar manner if the conversion is of an interest in a domestic
LLC taxed as a partnership for Federal tax purposes into an
interest in a domestic partnership. Moreover, it does not
matter how the conversion is achieved under the state law.
F.
Rev. Rul. 95-41. 1995-23 I.R.B. 5. In this Ruling, the
Service gives guidance on the interplay between Sec. 704(c),
I.R.C and the allocation of nonrecourse liabilities under Reg.
§1.752-3 (a).
FACTS:

A and B form a partnership and agree that each will be
allocated 50% of all partnership items. A contributes
depreciable property subject to a nonrecourse liability of
$6,000, with an adjusted tax basis of $4,000 and a fair market
value of $10,000. B contributes $4,000 cash.
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ANALYSIS:
Upon A's contribution of the depreciable property, there is
$6,000 of Sec 704(c), I.R.C built-in gain. A's share of the
partnership's nonrecourse liabilities is determined under Reg.
§1.752-3.
(1) First Tier Allocations -- Under Reg. §1.7523(a) (1), a partner's share of the nonrecourse liabilities of a
partnership includes the partner's share of partnership minimum
gain. Because partnership minimum gain is computed using the
contributed property's book value rather than its tax basis,
allocations of nonrecourse liabilities are not affected by Sec.
704(c), I.R.C. In addition, because the book value at the time
of contribution exceeds the amount of the nonrecourse liability,
there is no partnership minimum gain immediately after the
contribution, and, thus, neither A nor B receives an allocation
of nonrecourse liabilities under Reg. §1.752-3(a) (1) immediately
after the contribution.
(2)

Second Tier Allocations -- Under Reg. §1.752-

3(a)(2), a partner's share of the nonrecourse liabilities of the
partnership includes the amount of taxable gain that would be
allocated to the contributing partner under Sec. 704(c), I.R.C.
If the partnership sold the contributed property in full
satisfaction of the liability and for no other consideration, the
partnership would recognize a taxable gain of $2,000 on the sale.
All of this taxable gain would be allocated to A. The
hypothetical sale also would result in a book loss of $4,000.
Because this book loss would be allocated equally between A'and
B, B would receive a $2,000 book loss but no corresponding tax
loss, creating a disparity between B's book and tax allocations.
(a)

Traditional Method -- If the partnership used

the traditional method of making Reg. §1.704-3(b) allocations, A
would be allocated a total of $2,000 of taxable gain from the
hypothetical sale of the contributed property and so would be
allocated $2,000 of nonrecourse liabilities immediately after the
contribution.
(b) Remedial Method -- If the partnership adopted

the remedial allocation method, the partnership would be required
to make a remedial allocation of $2,000 of tax loss to B in
connection with the hypothetical sale to eliminate the $2,000
disparity. The partnership also would be required to make an
offsetting remedial allocation-of tax gain to A of $2,000. Thus,
A would be allocated a total of $4,000 of tax gain and would be
allocated $4,000 of nonrecourse liabilities immediately after the
contribution.
(c)

Curative Allocations Method -- Because any

potential curative allocations cannot be determined solely from
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the hypothetical sale of the contributed property, curative
allocations are not taken into account in allocating nonrecourse
Thus, under this method,
liabilities under Reg. §1.752-3(a) (2).
A would be allocated $2,000 of nonrecourse liabilities
immediately after the contribution.
(3) Third Tier Allocations -- After the allocation

pursuant to Reg. §1.752-3(a) (2), the partnership has excess
nonrecourse liabilities that must be allocated pursuant to Reg.
§1.752-3(a) (3).
This Regulation provides several alternatives:
(a) Partners' Shares of Partnership Profits -- The

partnership could choose to allocate the excess nonrecourse
liabilities in accordance with the partners' shares of
partnership profits. Two facts which are taken into account in
making this determination are (1) the partnership agreement and
(2) a partner's share of built-in gain to the extent that the
gain was not taken into account in making an allocation of
nonrecourse liabilities under Reg. §1.752-3(a) (2).
(b)

Pursuant to Partnership Acrreement

--

The

partnership agreement may specify the partners' interests in
partnership profits for purposes of allocating excess nonrecourse
liabilities, provided that the interests specified are reasonably
consistent with allocations that have substantial economic
effect.
(c)

In Accordance with Deductions -- The

partnership may choose to allocate the excess nonrecourse
liabilities in accordance with the manner in which it is
reasonably expected that the deductions attributable to the
excess nonrecourse liabilities will be allocated. Because all
tax depreciation will be allocated to B, if the partnership
chooses this method, then all of the excess nonrecourse
liabilities must be allocated to B.
The Service and the
G.
Notice 95-14. 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
Treasury issued this notice regarding the possible simplification
of the classification regulations under Sec. 7701, I.R.C. for
domestic unincorporated business organizations and foreign
business organizations.
The existing classification regulations are based on the
historical differences under local law between partnerships and
corporations. However, many states recently have revised their
statutes to provide that partnerships and other unincorporated
organizations may possess characteristics that have traditionally
been associated with corporations, thereby considerably narrowing
the traditional distinctions. A consequence of this narrowing is
that taxpayers can achieve partnership tax classification for a
non-publicly traded organization although it is virtually
indistinguishable from a corporation. Currently, taxpayers and
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A44

-

40

-

the Service expend considerable resources in determining the
proper classification of these organizations.
1.
Domestic Unincorporated Business Organizations -The Service is proposing that, with respect to a domestic
unincorporated business organization which has two or more
associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the
gains therefrom, taxpayers should be allowed to elect whether
they wish to be taxed as a partnership or an association unless
the organization's classification is determined under a Code
section other than Secs. 7701(a) (2) and (3), I.R.C.
Because the Service and Treasury believe that these entities
typically are formed to obtain partnership classification, such
organizations would be classified as partnerships for Federal tax
purposes unless an election were filed to be classified as an
association. Under this approach, all elections would be
prospective, executed by all members and binding on all future
members until superseded by a subsequent election. An election
to change the classification of an organization would have the
same Federal tax consequences as a change in classification under
current law.
2.

ForeiQn Business Orqanizations -- The Service and

Treasury are also considering simplifying the classification
rules for foreign organizations. However, they are concerned
because (1) there is no foreign analogue for a state-law
corporation, so no foreign organization is automatically treated
as a corporation for Federal tax purposes, (2) there is the
possibility of inconsistent, or hybrid, entity classification,
and (3) a purely elective approach could have a substantive
effect on entity classification by increasing taxpayers'
flexibility to achieve their desired classification of certain
foreign organizations.
V.

PRIVATE LETTER RULINGS

The married
A.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9431025 (May 6, 1994).
taxpayers held a fee interest in Lots 1 and 2. Lot 1 was
purchased as a home, and Lot 2 was purchased for investment or
other use. A developer proposed acquiring the north half acre of
Lot 1 and all of Lot 2 in a simultaneous exchange under Sec.
1031, I.R.C. for 2 town houses to be built on land acquired from
the taxpayer's neighbor. With respect to Lot 2, the taxpayers
had offered Lot 2 to developers from 1979 until the present, with
a sign on the property. They had received numerous inquiries
before making the agreement with the developer. The house,
however, was not offered for sale or exchange until the developer
insisted he needed more land.
The Service determined that the exchange of Lot 2 for the
two townhouses to be built would qualify as an exchange of
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property of a like kind held for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment within the meaning of Sec. 1031(a) (1),
I.R.C.
However, gain or loss had to be recognized on Lot 1,
which the taxpayers had not represented to be investment
property.
B.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9433003 (April 29, 1994).
In this
ruling, the decedent owned 94 acres of unimproved land, '
consisting of approximately 50% open fields and 50% woodlands.
In 1985, the decedent's son and granddaughter started operating a
horse boarding and riding business. On April 22, 1988, the
decedent executed a revocable trust, transferring the 94 acre
parcel to the trust. On September 11, 1989, the trustees of the
revocable trust entered into a contract with a land development
corporation, to "immediately begin the planning and engineering
necessary to convert the land from its present agricultural usage
into residential building lots." On February 16, 1990, an
application was made for a preliminary plan of subdivision. At
the time of the decedent's death on July 8, 1991, the preliminary
plan of subdivision and the sewer authorization had not been
approved. Since the decedent's death, the land development
contract had been terminated, and no lots had been sold. The
property continued to be used in the horse boarding and riding
business.
In this Technical Advice Memorandum, the Service determined
that the decedent's estate could elect under Sec. 2032A, I.R.C.
to value the 94 acres based on its use in the horse boarding and
riding business, rather than its value based on its highest and
best use -- subdivided land. The Service determined that the
Sec. 2032A(b) (2), I.R.C. requirement that the property be used in
a trade or business was satisfied with respect to the open
fields, but came to no conclusions with respect to the woodlands.
The Service found that, because no physical action was taken
during decedent's life which prevented the land from being used
in the ongoing horse boarding and riding trade or business, the
fact that the trustees intended to develop the land did not
interrupt or restrict the use of the land in the business.
C.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9439007 (June 29, 1994).
The taxpayer
and related persons owned undivided interests in different tracts
of land. The ownership was fragmented in a complex manner. The
parties planned to transfer all their interests to a qualified
intermediary who would then transfer whole interests in specific
tracts to the parties.
The Service determined that the taxpayer would be
simultaneously exchanging real property held for productive use
in a trade or business or for investment solely for other real
property to be held in the same manner, so that this was a likekind exchange under Sec. 1031(a), I.R.C. The Service cautioned
the taxpayer that it doubted whether this transaction, with or
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without an intermediary, would constitute a valid exchange under
Sec. 1031, I.R.C. if the values of the properties being
relinquished and received by each of the parties were not
approximately equal. The taxpayer was also cautioned of the
possible application of Sec. 1031(f), I.R.C.
In this
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9440026 (July 11, 1994).
D.
of rulings
number
a
desired
ruling, the taxpayer, a corporation,
on its
restrictions
stock
of
certain
effect
the
(1) regarding
was
income
certain
whether
(2)
REIT,
a
qualification as
considered to be rents from real property, and (3) whether
certain dividends would be deductible from REIT taxable income.
The taxpayer's articles of incorporation provide for three
transfer restrictions. First, the articles prohibit any transfer
of stock that would cause the transferee to own more than a
certain percent of the value of common and preferred stock.
Second, the articles prohibit any transfer of stock that would
cause the taxpayer to be closely held. Third, the articles
prohibit any transfer of stock that would result in less than 100
persons holding the stock of the taxpayer. Each stock
certificate bears a legend noting the three restrictions.
An attempted transfer of shares in violation of the
restrictions is void ab initio. Such an attempt causes the
shares in violation to be exchanged for "Excess Stock", which is
then held by the taxpayer. The taxpayer retains an option to
purchase the Excess Stock within 90 days of the later of the
attempted transfer or the discovery by the taxpayer of the
attempted transfer. The Excess Stock will have no voting rights
and will not be entitled to any dividends or periodic
distributions. The taxpayer may sell the Excess Stock to a
person whose ownership will not violate the restrictions. The
taxpayer received an opinion of counsel that the restrictions
were enforceable under state law. It also represented that it
would use its best efforts to enforce the restrictions.
The taxpayer also intends to enter into employment
agreements under which it would grant employees options to
purchase its stock as additional compensation. Under these
agreements, if an employee terminates employment for any reason
before becoming vested, the stock is deemed to be reconveyed to
the taxpayer.
Sec. 856(a) (6), I.R.C. disqualifies a corporation from REIT
status if it is closely held. -The Service determined that, so
long as the limit was valid under state law and the taxpayer used
its best efforts to enforce the limit, a transfer made in
violation of the limit would not result in those shares being
owned by the purported transferee for Federal income tax
purposes. However, the Excess Stock would be treated as treasury
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stock of the taxpayer. Thus, these ownership restrictions might
not prevent the taxpayer from being considered closely held.
Under Secs. 857(b) (2)(B), 561 and 562(a) I.R.C.,
preferential dividends do not qualify as a deduction in computing
a REIT's taxable income. Because the Excess Stock is not
considered to be outstanding, dividends paid on the outstanding
stock would not be considered to be preferential vis-a-vis the
shares of Excess Stock.
Under Sec. 856(a) (2), I.R.C., the beneficial ownership of a
REIT must be freely transferable. The Service determined that
the issuance of a small percentage of the stock by the taxpayer
to its employees under the restrictions in the employee stock
agreements would not cause the taxpayer to fail to satisfy this
requirement.
The taxpayer also wanted to know whether amounts received by
partnerships of which the taxpayer was a general partner, for
management activities and services at residential rental
properties and leasing fees related to space for vending machines
and pay telephones, would be rents from real property. The
Service determined that the performance by the partnerships of
these services or receipt of income from these leases'would not
cause the income from the properties to be characterized as
something other than "rents from real property" under Sec.
856(d), I.R.C.
E.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9443018 (July 22, 1994). An entity was
organized as a LLC pursuant to the Florida Limited Liability
Company Act. There were two members, each of whom owned 50%.
The LLC was determined to be taxable as a partnership because it
lacked the corporate characteristics of continuity of life and
free transferability of interests based on its Articles of
Organization, which were in conformance with the Florida Act.
The ruling stated that it was subject to the requirements set
forth in Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, but the requirements
set forth in Sec. 4 of Rev. Proc. 89-12 did not apply to this
ruling.
F.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9436005 (May 26, 1994).
In this
Technical Advice Memorandum, the donor owned 100% of the
outstanding stock of a corporation. In December, 1989, he
transferred approximately 30% to each of his three children. He
also transferred 5% to his spouse. With respect to each gift,
the stock was valued at approximately $50 per share, representing
the net asset value of the corporation less a 25% discount
characterized as a discount for "minority interest and
marketability".
Relying on Estate of Winkler v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1989-232,
where the Court found that the decedent's minority block had
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special "swing vote" characteristics that enhanced its value,
offsetting any minority discount otherwise available, the Service
determined that each 30% gift, viewed separately, possessed the
same swing vote characteristics.
The donor argued that attributing a swing vote value to each
transferred block produced an arbitrary result because, if the
donor had transferred the separate blocks at different times, a
discount would be allowed. The Service determined this would not
be true because, while the first block might be entitled to a
discount, the first transferee's block would gain swing vote
value-upon the second transfer and would constitute an indirect
gift. Likewise, the third block would have swing vote value
because of the two earlier transfers. Thus, even if the three
transfers were made at different times, the total value of the
gifts would ultimately be the same as if the three transfers were
made simultaneously.
The Service noted that all relevant factors, including swing
vote potential, the minority nature of each block and any
marketability concerns, should be taken into account in valuing
each block.
G.
Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 9437007, 9437008 (June 10,1994).
Old Partnership owned two residential projects. The partners
wanted to place the projects in separate partnerships to insulate
them from the liabilities of Old Partnership's commercial
properties and to facilitate any future refinancing. To
accomplish this, Old Partnership planned to transfer its
interests in the projects to two New Partnerships and
simultaneously distribute the interests in the New Partnerships
to the Partners in proportion to their percentage interests in
Old Partnership. One of the projects is not encumbered by an
indebtedness, but the other one is. The commercial properties
are encumbered. The current fair market value of each project
exceeds the outstanding balance of the liabilities encumbering
each of such properties. The Partners have negative tax capital
accounts.
The Service determined that the transfer by Old Partnership
to the New Partnerships will be treated as a contribution of
property by Old Partnership to New Partnerships, with a
simultaneous distribution of the interests in the New
Partnerships to the Partners of Old Partnership. Under Sec. 708,
I.R.C., the New Partnerships will be considered to be
continuations of Old Partnership. There will be no deemed
contribution or distribution of money under Sec. 752, I.R.C., and
the transaction will not be considered to be a sale or exchange
of Sec. 751, I.R.C. property.
H.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9444004 (November 9, 1993).
In this
ruling, the taxpayer, a corporation, intended to form a
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partnership with a new investor. The corporation was to
contribute one of its lines of business to the partnership in
return for an interest. The new investor would contribute cash.
The corporation and the partnership were going to enter into a
contract that would allow the corporation to continue to use
certain assets that would be transferred to the partnership. The
partnership planned to assume some of the business's debts;
however, some debts could not be transferred because of the terms
of the loan agreements between the corporation and the lenders.
In addition, the corporation had made capital expenditures for
property in connection with the transferred business within 30
days of-receiving proceeds from loans incurred to finance the
transferred business. The partnership agreement provided that,
to the extent certain investor cash contributions to the
partnership exceeded the liabilities transferred by the
corporation, the cash would be immediately distributed to the
corporation with respect to its preformation expenses.
The Service held that, for purposes of Sec. 707(a) (2) (B),
I.R.C. and the disguised sale rules, qualified liabilities
included only liabilities which were assumed, or taken subject
to, by the partnership. Qualified liabilities did not include
the liabilities which could not be transferred due to lender
restrictions.
In this
I.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9444013 (July 30, 1994).
ruling, the taxpayers were two general partnerships, each of
which had the same six partners owning the same percentage of
profits and losses in both partnerships. Two of the partners,
representing 30% of the total partnership interests, were estates
of deceased former partners. In the case of each deceased former
partner, the partnership had stepped up the basis of the assets
under Sec. 743, I.R.C., pursuant to an election under Sec. 754,
I.R.C.
Each partnership owned a portion of a retail shopping
center, which portions together comprised the entire shopping
center. The dollar value of the assets in one partnership was
greater than the dollar value of the assets in the other
partnership. The assets of each partnership included certain
property that was placed in service prior to January 1, 1981.
In order to achieve economies in the operation of the
shopping center, the partnerships proposed to consolidate by
contributing all of their respective assets, subject to all of
their respective liabilities, to a newly formed general
partnership. The partnerships would then liquidate by
distributing their respective interests in the new partnership to
the respective partners in accordance with the partners'
respective capital account balances. The taxpayers needed
guidance with respect to the impact of Sec. 708, I.R.C. on the
effects of this transaction.
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Because the members of both partnerships owned an interest
of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits of the new
partnership, the new partnership was considered a continuation of
the partnership with the greater dollar value in assets pursuant
to Reg. §1.708-1(b) (2)(i). The other partnership was considered
to have contributed all of its assets and transferred all of its
liabilities to the new partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest, and then would be considered to terminate, with its
partners considered to have received in liquidation the
partnership interests in the new partnership.
As a result of the termination of one of the partnerships,
the depreciation deduction under Sec. 167, I.R.C. applicable to
its property transferred was determined in accordance with the
rules of Sec. 381(c) (6), I.R.C. pursuant to Sec. 168(f) (5),
I.R.C. The depreciation methods and periods of the pre-ACRS
property that was transferred by the partnership which was
considered to continue would be unaffected by the consolidation.
The Service also determined that there was no real effect on
the treatment of the terminating partnership's Sec. 743(b),
I.R.C. adjustment, citing Rev. Rul. 87-115, 1987-2 C.B. 163.
Such adjustment would continue to be segregated and allocated to
the partners to which it applied.
In this
J.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9444030 (August 4, 1994).
ruling, the taxpayer was a trust established by a woman's 13
grandchildren. The trust held real property that the
grandchildren had inherited from their grandmother. The
grandchildren contributed their undivided fractional interests in
the property to a trust so that no one of them could force a
partition, and so that the property could be efficiently managed
by the trustees of the trust. The property had been owned by the
woman and her family for nearly 100 years. There were five
houses on the property, which were used for vacation purposes by
the family and friends of the grandchildren. The trust
declaration specifically stated that the purposes of the trust
were principally to provide for the proper and convenient
management of the real property and to maintain and preserve it
for the enjoyment and advantage of the blood descendants of the
woman. The trustees were prohibited from conducting a trade or
business. The Service determined the arrangement would be
treated as a trust and not an association because it was shown,
pursuant to Sec. 7701, I.R.C., that the purpose of the
arrangement was to vest in the trustees responsibility for the
protection and conservation of property for beneficiaries who
could not share in the discharge of this responsibility and,
therefore, were not associates in a joint enterprise for the
conduct of business for profit.
In this
K.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9447028 (AuQust 25. 1994).
ruling, the taxpayer planned to donate land to the State to
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construct a highway interchange. The taxpayer also planned to
develop a planned residential community near the highway. The
taxpayer represented that access to this development would be
provided by existing roads and internal roads and would be
sufficient to meet anticipated traffic demands without use of the
highway. The taxpayer also represented that construction of the
highway was not required in order for development of the
community to occur. In addition, the taxpayer had agreed to
donate tangible personal property, fund a portion of the cost to
construct collector/distributor roads and fund part of the
state's economic feasibility shortfall. The Service found that
all these amounts would qualify as charitable contributions under
Sec. 170, I.R.C. because any benefit which the taxpayer would
receive was incidental in comparison to the benefits to the
public.
L.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9448010 (Auqust 29, 1994).
In this
ruling, the taxpayer wanted to dispose of equipment previously
used in its leasing trade or business, and acquire property of a
like-kind using an intermediary in a deferred like-kind exchange.
The proposed form of the transaction was as follows:
The taxpayer would enter into a sales agreement to sell its
property to an unrelated third party. The taxpayer would also
enter into an exchange.contract with an intermediary which would
provide that, pursuant to an assignment agreement, the
intermediary would be assigned all of the taxpayer's rights, but
not its obligations, under the sales agreement. Upon receipt of
the purchase price, the intermediary would deposit the cash
received into an escrow account which would be placed, at the
sole discretion of the taxpayer, into an interest-bearing account
or non-interest bearing account. The escrow holder was expected
to be a financial institution that had performed, and was
expected to continue to perform, a wide range of financial
services for the taxpayer and its affiliates. When cash was
placed in a non-interest bearing account, the taxpayer was
expecting to receive other forms of consideration approximating
the value of the foregone interest, including a waiver of certain
bank fees or other charges. However, the taxpayer would not be
entitled to receive, pledge, borrow or otherwise obtain the
benefits of the interest or other forms of consideration before
the end of the exchange period.
Upon satisfaction of all the terms and conditions of the
sale agreement, legal title to the taxpayer's property would be
transferred directly to the purchaser. The taxpayer then would
contract to purchase replacement property from an unrelated third
party who would be committed to lease the equipment once the
taxpayer acquired it. To the extent that the cost of the
replacement equipment exceeds the sale proceeds held by the
escrow holder, the taxpayer intends either to pay such excess
directly to the owner of the replacement property or deposit such
1IS6CS90.2H
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excess with the escrow holder so that payment to the seller will
be made from a single source.
Based upon the information and representations presented by
the taxpayer, the Service found that this would constitute a good
deferred like-kind exchange under Sec. 1031, I.R.C.
In this
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9449001 (March 11, 1994).
M.
of
the stock
all
transferred
donor
a
Memorandum,
Technical Advice
in a wholly owned corporation by making equal gifts of stock to
each of his 11 children. After the transfer, the corporate stock
was owned by 11 individual shareholders, each of whom owned less
than 10 percent of the outstanding stock. The National Office
was requested to determine whether the value of simultaneous
gifts of stock in a corporation to two or more donees is to be
determined in the same manner as the bequest of stock in a
corporation to two or more legatees. The Service concluded that,
unlike the estate tax, where the tax is imposed on an aggregation
of all the decedent's assets, the gift tax is imposed on the
property passing from the donor to each donee, and it is the
value of that property passing from the donor to the donee that
is the basis for measuring the tax. Thus, the value of the gift
to each donee is determined by considering each gift separately
and not by aggregating all of the donor's holdings in the
corporation immediately prior to the gift. The Service also
stated that the application of any discounts for lack of control
or marketability would be determined in connection with each
separate gift to each donee.
The
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9449008 (September 1, 1994).
N.
taxpayer was a common parent of a consolidated group. One of its
subsidiaries was in the business of real estate development and
provided real estate consulting services. Another was in the
business of development, operation and sale of resort properties,
and a third was in the business of operating theme and water
parks, golf course, hotel, restaurant and merchandise shops and
other entertainment facilities.
The first subsidiary owned certain unimproved real property.
It proposed to divide the property into two interests, an estate
for years interest and a remainder interest, selling the
remainder to the third subsidiary immediately and the estate for
years to the second subsidiary at some later date. Both sales
would be at fair market value.
The taxpayer requested guidance on how the first subsidiary
should allocate basis and how its gain would be calculated and
reported. The Service determined that the subsidiary would
allocate its basis in the total property between the estate for
years and the remainder based on the relative fair market values
of the interests. The fair market value of the remainder was
computed by determining its.present value consistent with Sec.
1615Cs90.2H

-

49

-

A53

7520, I.R.C. and its actuarial factors. The fair market value of
the estate for years was the difference between the fair market
value of the entire property and the remainder. The subsidiary's
gains on sale of the two interests were determined using Sec.
1001, I.R.C.; however, because it was a member of a consolidated
group, the transactions would be deferred intercompany
transactions under Reg. §1.1502-13 and would not be restored
until an event described in Reg. §1.1502-13(d), (e) or (f)
occurred.
0.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9450025 (September 16, 1994).
The
taxpayer owned real property. A state authority wrote to the
taxpayer expressing its interest in acquiring the property. In
its letter, the authority stated that, while it had condemnation
authority and could condemn the property, it currently lacked the
funds to effect a condemnation. Accordingly, it proposed that
the taxpayer consider a voluntary sale. The authority also noted
that, if the negotiations were unsuccessful, it would request
approval of a bond measure to provide it with sufficient funds to
acquire the property. The authority proposed purchasing the
property immediately for a discounted cash payment.
Alternatively, the authority proposed paying the entire fair
market value of the property using a structured payment plan.
The Service held that the taxpayer could elect to apply Sec.
1033, I.R.C. because the authority had demonstrated unequivocally
its intention to acquire the real estate using its power of
eminent domain if its efforts to reach a negotiated sale proved
unsuccessful.
P.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9451050 (September 22, 1994).
In 1981,
a limited partnership was formed; its agreement was never
amended. The three general partners were a woman and her two
adult daughters. Each general partner had one vote. The
original partnership agreement provided for three classes of
limited partnership interests -- classes A, B and C. The woman
was the only class A limited partner. The class B limited
partners were the adult daughters, each in her individual
capacity and as trustee of a trust for her own benefit or for the
benefit of her spouse and descendants. The class C limited
partner interests were owned by the woman's grandchildren, either
outright or as beneficiaries.
The partnership owned three parcels of realty, with the fair
market value of each parcel representing, respectively, 7.22%,
7.22% and 37.7% of the current fair market value of the net total
partnership assets. In this ruling, the partners planned to
restructure the partnership by transferring each parcel of real
estate to a new limited partnership, each of which would have 3
corporate general partners. The existing partnership would
continue to hold its remaining assets. The partnership
agreements of the new limited partnerships were to be
1615C5902.
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substantially identical to each other and to that of the original
partnership.
The original partnership agreement restricted transfers of
partnership interests, provided options to purchase such
interests, provided for the succession of general partners and
provided for the dissolution or continuance of the partnership
upon the withdrawal, death or legal insolvency of any partner.
Under the proposed transaction, before any of the steps needed to
effectuate the transaction were taken, all of the partners of the
original partnership, all of the partners of the new partnerships
and all of the shareholders of the new corporations intended to
execute an agreement which would apply the buy-sell restrictions
of the original partnership agreement to the shares of each
shareholder in each new corporation, as well as to the
partnership interests of each partner in the original partnership
and the new limited partnerships. The taxpayers requested a
ruling that the proposed transaction would not be subject to Sec.
2701, 2703 or 2704, I.R.C.
The Service determined that Sec. 2701, I.R.C would not apply
to the transaction because, after the proposed transaction, each
limited and general partner in the original partnership would
have substantially the same interest, rights and limitations in
the assets of the new entities and the remaining original
partnership as they had before the proposed transaction. Under
these circumstances, the retained interests held by each person
in the original partnership were not "applicable retained
interests" under Reg. §25.2701-1(c) (3) because the rights
attendant to the retained interests were identical to the rights
in the transferred interest, except for non-lapsing differences
with respect to limitations on liability.
Sec. 2703, I.R.C. applies to an agreement, option, right or
restriction entered into or granted after October 8, 1990. The
Section also applies to any agreement, option, right or
restriction that was entered into, or granted, on or prior to
October 8, 1990, and substantially modified after October 8,
1990. Sec. 2704, I.R.C. applies to restrictions or rights (or
limitations on rights) created after October 8, 1990. The
Service determined that neither Section applied to the proposed
transaction. Because the proposed transaction effectuated a
continuation of the terms of the original partnership agreement
and any options, rights.to acquire property and other
restrictions and rights in that agreement, it was determined that
the proposed transaction would not result in a substantial
modification of the agreement so as to fall under the purview of
Sec. 2703, I.R.C. Similarly, Sec. 2704, I.R.C. did not apply
because the transaction did not involve the creation of any new
restrictions or rights (or limitations on rights) after October
8, 1990.
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Q.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9501001 (November 19, 1993). In this
Technical Advice Memorandum, two individuals each owned a 50%
interest in a S corporation that had no accumulated earnings and
profits. During 1988, this S corporation conducted several
activities (as defined in Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T).
In 1988, the S
corporation distributed money to both stockholders. These
distributions constituted distributions of property to which, but
for Sec. 1368(a), I.R.C. (which states that distributions from S
corporations with no accumulated earnings and profits will be
treated as gain from the sale or exchange of property to the
extent such distributions are in excess of the stock's basis),
Sec. 301(c), I.R.C. would apply. Because of losses sustained by
the S corporation, both stockholders had a zero basis in their
stock at all times during 1988.
Because Sec. 1368(b) (2), I.R.C. treats the S corporation's
distributions in excess of the stockholder's bases as gain from
the sale or exchange of properties, the Service determined that
Temp. Reg. §1.469-2T(e) (3) determines how the gain treated for
purposes of Sec. 469, I.R.C. is allocated. Pursuant to Temp.
Reg. §1.469-2T(e) (3)(iv) (A) (because the distribution occurred in
the 1988 calendar taxable year, a year which began prior to
February 19, 1988), gain recognized from the distributions is
allocated among the S corporation's activities under any
reasonable method selected by the S corporation. The Service
noted that one reasonable method the S corporation could select
would be the method prescribed by Temp. Reg. §1.469-2T(e) (3)(ii).
Once the gain is allocated, the activity's character determines
whether the gain is passive or active.
R.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9502037 (October 19. 1995). The
taxpayer was a corporation which intended to elect to be a REIT.
It held no real estate assets directly, but it had a partnership
interest in Ops which held real property directly and indirectly
through partnerships. With respect to all of the real estate
properties, Ops planned to perform management and leasing
services. Ops planned to perform the same management and leasing
services for two partnerships in which neither Ops nor the REIT
owned any partnership interest. With respect to shopping
centers, Ops planned to provide: (i) ordinary, necessary and
customary common area services; (ii) all necessary services
relating to HVAC, electrical and plumbing systems; (iii) usual
and customary utility services; and (iv) parking areas on an
unreserved, no-charge basis. With respect to office buildings,
Ops planned to provide ordinary and necessary maintenance
services, as well as access to-a parking garage which would be
managed by an independent contractor. One office building was
connected to a hotel that was going to be leased to a limited
partnership and operated by an independent contractor. Ops also
planned on owning all of the non-voting preferred stock of a
company which was engaged in the construction business and would
provide real estate development, engineering, architectural and
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construction services to Ops in connection with its existing
properties and properties that it might acquire in the future.
The Service determined that the performance by Ops of the
planned services would not cause the income from the properties
to be characterized as something other than "rents from real
property". Such services would not be disqualified services,
pursuant to Reg. §1.512(b)-1(c) (5) (nonqualifying services are
those rendered to the occupant primarily for the occupant's
convenience and are other than usually or customarily rendered in
connection with the rental of space for occupancy only), Rev.
Rul. 69-176, 1969-1 C.B. 158 (utilities and janitorial services
are qualified services for purposes of Sec. 512(b) (3), I.R.C.),
and Rev. Rul. 80-297, 1980-2 C.B. 158 (the proceeds from the
leasing of tennis facilities to a 3rd party for a fixed fee
without services is rent).
The Service also determined that, since Ops would be
allocating fees to its partners based on each partner's capital
interest, a significant amount allocated to the REIT would be in
effect for services provided to its own properties. To this
extent, pursuant to Reg. §1.856-3(g), the amounts would be
disregarded for purposes of applying the gross income tests under
Sec. 856(c) (2), I.R.C. (95% test) and Sec. 856(c) (3),. I.R.C. (75%
However, to the extent that the taxpayer was deemed to
test).
receive amounts for services that were provided to third parties,
these amounts would be treated as "other than rents from real
property."
In 1949,
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9503025 (October 27, 1994).
S.
home
a
vacation
purchased
spouse
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trust
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was
that
1964, two lots on the opposite side of the avenue were purchased.
These two lots were contiguous to a bay and together were the
same size as the single lot on which the house was situated. The
two lots provided a view and access to the bay. The grantor and
his spouse requested a ruling that the two lots were not in
excess of that which was reasonably appropriate for residential
purposes within the meaning of Reg. §25.2702-5(c).
Under Reg. §25.2702-5(c) (2)(ii), a personal residence may
include adjacent land not in excess of that which is reasonably
appropriate for residential purposes (taking into account the
residence's size and location). The Service concluded that
distinct parcels can, in appropriate circumstances, constitute
adjacent land. The Service concluded this was such a case
because the two lots had been used as a part of the vacation
residence for 30 years and the grantor and his spouse intended to
continue using the lots in the same manner.
The
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9504019 (October 28, 1994).
T.
taxpayer was an S corporation which owned part of another
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corporation. The taxpayer intended to merge with the other
corporation. After the merger, the taxpayer would conduct the
combined rental operations of both corporations. In this rental
operation, the officers were involved in each major decision
affecting operations. The taxpayer advertised its properties.
It had employees who handled all lease negotiation and
administrative work. On short-term leases, it was responsible
for maintenance. *It incurred significant expenses for salaries,
payroll taxes, employee benefits, maintenance, insurance and
legal expenses.
Under all the facts and circumstances, the Service
determined that the rental income received was not passive
investment income for purposes of Sec. 1362(d)(3)(D) (i), I.R.C.
U.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9505002 (September 20, 1994).
In
this Technical Advice Memorandum, the taxpayers owned an interest
in a condominium in a beach-resort area. The ownership gave the
taxpayers the right to use the property for a certain number of
weeks a year. The property was an ocean-front resort-type
condominium that offered various amenities, such as an off-site
pool, tennis and golf memberships. The taxpayers paid for the
use of the amenities through association dues. The taxpayers
rented the condominium to third parties for an average period of
less than 7 days. Significant services were not provided by the
taxpayers or on their behalf. The taxpayers did not materially
participate in the condominium activity during the tax years in
questions, but it was represented that they did actively
participate in the activity during those years.
The Service determined that, pursuant to Temp. Reg. §1.4691T(e) (3) (ii) (A), the taxpayers' activity of providing a
condominium for use by customers was a trade or business activity
that was not a rental activity for purposes of Sec. 469, I.R.C.
Therefore, the taxpayers were not eligible for the $25,000 offset
for rental real estate activities under Sec. 469(i), I.R.C. with
respect to that activity.
V.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9505011 (November 4, 1994).
In 1990,
the taxpayer, a corporation, entered into a stock redemption
agreement with certain of its shareholders. Pursuant to the
agreement, one of the shareholders sold certain of its shares for
cash and a 15-year promissory note. The shareholder did not
elect out of the installment sale method under Sec. 453(d),
I.R.C. and, therefore, was reporting gain under the installment
method of accounting. The corporation believed it would soon be
experiencing cash flow problems. The corporation had a
subordination agreement with its bank which provided that it
could not make principal payments on the promissory note unless
it delivered a "no default certificate" to the bank. The bank,
believing that it would be likely that the corporation would not
be able to make the scheduled principal payments on the
1615Cs90.2H
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promissory note, suggested that the corporation consider
restructuring the promissory note.
Absent a restructuring, the principal would have been paid
in equal installments from 1996-2005. The corporation proposed
making principal payments from 1996-2015, with smaller amounts
being paid in the earlier years. The terms of the note in all
other respects would remain unchanged.
Citing Rev. Rul. 68-419, 1968-2 C.B. 196, and Rhombar Co. v.
Comm'r, 47 TC 75 (1966), aca., 1967-2 C.B. 3, as support, the
Service determined that this modification would not constitute a
disposition or satisfaction of the note within the meaning of
Sec. 453B, I.R.C., so that the stockholder should continue to
report the gain as the remaining note payments are received.
W.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9506046 (November 17, 1994). The
taxpayer was an organization exempt from Federal income tax under
Sec. 501(c) (6), I.R.C. It supported a junior golf program,
conducted tournaments and provided services such as handicapping
to member clubs. It owned land which it intended to develop into
a public golf course. No debt was associated with the land, but
the organization intended to borrow funds in the future to
provide capital to complete the construction of the golf course
improvements and to purchase.related equipment.
The taxpayer stated that, in order to eliminate the
economic, personal and property liability risks associated with
construction of the golf course, and because the construction and
operation of the golf course were not in keeping with its exempt
purpose, it had formed a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary.
This subsidiary was to be the development company and was going
to be the initial lessee of the property. In addition, the
subsidiary was to provide ongoing maintenance and improvement
services both before and after the golf course opened. Because
the subsidiary did not have the unique expertise necessary for
management of a golf course, the subsidiary contemplated forming
a wholly owned for-profit subsidiary (second-tier) which would
possess the special expertise necessary to manage and operate
the golf course. This second-tier subsidiary would purchase and
own all furniture and fixtures. In addition, it would assume the
lease of the golf course from the subsidiary and pay the taxpayer
rent.
The taxpayer represented that both subsidiaries had economic
and operational lives separate-from itself and that both
subsidiaries had a business purpose of earning a profit. All
parties were to deal on an arms-length basis with each other.
Under Sec. 512(b) (13), I.R.C., rents derived from a
controlled organization are unrelated business taxable income.
This is an exception to the-general rule excluding rents from
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real property under Sec. 512(b) (3), I.R.C. Control means
ownership of stock possessing at least 80% of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at
least 80% of the total number of shares of all other classes.
The Service determined that the rent received from the
second-tier subsidiary would not constitute unrelated business
taxable income because the taxpayer would not own or "control"
the second-tier subsidiary. The second-tier subsidiary was not a
sham organization nor was it the taxpayer's instrumentality. It
had definite business purposes and activities. In addition, the
taxpayer also was not so involved in, or in control of, the dayto-day operations of the second-tier subsidiary that the
relationship between it and the taxpayer assumed the relationship
of principal and agent.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9507023 (November 18, 1994). The
X.
subject of this ruling is the proper allocation of partnership
nonrecourse liabilities among cross-collateralized properties
under Sec. 752, I.R.C. The taxpayer proposed forming a
partnership which would hold existing real estate. Some of this
real estate was financed with the proceeds of tax-exempt bond
indebtedness. This bond debt is secured by a first deed of trust
on a particular property and is nonrecourse in nature. This debt
is also secured by a "direct-pay" letter of credit issued by a
bank, whereby the bond trustee collects principal and interest
payments from the bank, which is reimbursed for these amounts by
the owner of the real estate. Any reimbursement obligations to
the bank are secured by a nonrecourse second deed of trust
obligation on the same property that secures the bond debt.
After the formation of this new partnership, it plans to
restructure the tax-exempt indebtedness. Rather than
restructuring the bond debt, the partnership will restructure the
bank's secured obligations. Each new obligation will be secured
by specific properties, some of which are currently collateral
and others of which are not. Thus, some bond debt may be secured
by property other than the property that secures the
corresponding reimbursement obligation. Each new obligation held
by the bank will specify a fixed dollar amount that the bank can
recover upon a foreclosure of any particular collateral property.
The Service determined that, for purposes of Sec. 752,
I.R.C., the bond debt may be allocated among the properties
serving as security based on the relative specified dollar
amounts that the bank can recover from each property upon a
foreclosure, subject to the reimbursement obligation.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9508019 (November 23. 1994). The
Y.
taxpayer was a REIT which owned, either directly or through
partnerships, shopping malls. As was usual and customary in the
geographic areas in which the shopping centers were located,
161SC59o.21
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merchants' associations were used for promoting and marketing the
shopping center as a whole to the public. Expenses of market
programs were paid out of fees collected by the merchants'
association or amounts contributed to marketing funds. The
merchants' associations were separate legal entities, generally
corporations, that were owned and operated by the tenants
occupying a shopping center. The taxpayer proposed undertaking
some or all of the administrative activities of the merchants'
associations which were currently being performed by an
independent manager. Such proposed activities included: (i) the
implementation of marketing and promotional activities, including
entering into contracts on behalf of the merchants' associations;
(ii) the collection of fees from members of the merchants'
association; (iii) the hire of vendors of advertising media; and
(iv) the payment of all expenses of the merchants' associations.
The Service determined that the performance by the REIT of
these management activities and services through the merchants'
association would not cause the income from the shopping centers
to be characterized as something other than "rents from real
property". Such services would not be disqualified services
because such services would be excluded from UBTI under Sec.
512(b) (3), I.R.C. if received by a Sec. 511(a) (2), I.R.C.
organization. See Reg. §1.512(b)-i(c)(5) (nonqualifying services
are those rendered to the occupant primarily for the occupant's
convenience and are other than usually or customarily rendered in
connection with the rental of space for occupancy only); Rev.
Rul. 69-176, 1969-1 C.B. 158 (utilities and janitorial services
are qualified services for purposes of Sec. 512(b) (3), I.R.C.);
and Rev. Rul. 80-297, 1980-2 C.B. 158 (leasing of tennis
facilities to a 3rd party for a fixed fee without services is
rent).
The Service also determined that any income received by the
REIT from partnerships in which it held an interest for services
that benefit third parties would be treated as "other than rents
from real property".
Z.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9508031 (November 29, 1994). The
taxpayer, a private foundation, was an irrevocable charitable
trust exempt under Sec. 501(c) (3), I.R.C. In 1994, a court had
modified the trust such that the only charitable beneficiaries
were schools. In addition to some cash, the taxpayer's principal
asset consisted of an undivided one-quarter interest in a
historical movie theater and adjacent retail space. About a year
earlier, the retail space was destroyed by a fire which also
caused minor damage to the theater. The taxpayer and other
owners planned to rebuild. Under the plan, a government agency
planned to provide money for refurbishing the theater, including
two additional theaters in the basement. This money would be
structured as a loan secured by the property, but would be
forgiven if the theater was .used continuously as a theater for
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twenty years. In addition, the agency planned to loan the owners
money to rebuild and expand the retail space. Other
rehabilitation funds were expected to come from a commercial loan
secured by a first deed of trust on the property.
The owners of the property had not formed, nor had they ever
intended to form, a partnership. Instead, they owned undivided
interests in the property as tenants-in-common.
The taxpayer determined to terminate its private foundation
status so that the debt incurred to rehabilitate the theater
would not be considered acquisition indebtedness causing rental
income to be UBTI. The Service approved the same.
The Service also determined that the debt taken on for
rehabilitation of the theater did not constitute acquisition
indebtedness because pursuant to Sec. 514(c) (9) (A), I.R.C. the
indebtedness of a "qualified organization" is not "acquisition
indebtedness" if incurred in acquiring or improving real
property. The trust would be a "qualified organization" because
of its status as a supporting organization under Sec. 509(a) (3),
I.R.C., and the trust would have incurred the debt to improve
real property.
AA. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9510030 (December 9, 1994).
The
taxpayer was a corporation that intended to elect REIT status.
It intended to conduct its business through an operating
partnership which would own real estate either directly or
through lower-tier partnerships. The REIT intended to perform
certain services though a corporation. The operating partnership
would own all of the nonvoting preferred stock, but none of the
voting common of this corporation. All of the voting common
would be owned by a company owned by certain officers of the
REIT. This corporation would be engaged in providing the
following services:
Construction Manaqement -- The property partnerships normally

provide an allowance for certain improvements in the lease space
at no charge to the tenant. Such build-out would be performed by
independent contractors. The REIT represented that it was usual
and customary for construction build-out work to be provided to
tenants free of charge by owners of rental properties of the same
class and located in the same geographic area. It also provided
an opinion letter from a national commercial property management
company that indicated that such practice was customary.
Space DesiQn --

The REIT, through the corporation, intended to

provide space design services at no charge. The REIT represented
that it was usual and customary for space design services to be
provided to tenants free of charge. It provided independent
verification of this fact.
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Parking -- The REIT represented, and independently verified, that
it was usual and customary to provide tenants with reserved
parking free of charge.
Health Club, Teleconference Center, Board Room, Art and Food
Service -- With respect to one property, several services and
amenities were made available to tenants and nontenants. These
included (i) a health club leased to an unrelated party; (ii) a
teleconference center available for rent to both tenants and
nontenants; (iii) a board room available for rent to tenants;
(iv) art located in a lobby open to all building visitors; and
(v) an executive dining room and self-service cafeteria available
to tenants and non-tenants and operated by an unrelated
corporation. However, a related corporation did receive income
or loss from this operation.
Gymnasiums -- Many of the office buildings had gyms to which
tenant employees had access by paying a nominal annual charge.
The Service determined that the provision to tenants of
construction services, space design services, reserved parking
spaces, the health club facility, the teleconference center, the
board room, the art, the food services and the gymnasiums would
not cause the income from the properties to be characterized as
something other than "rents from real property". Such services
would not be disqualified services because they would be excluded
from UBTI under Sec. 512(b) (3), I.R.C. if received by a Sec.
511(a) (2), I.R.C. organization. See Reg. §1.512(b)-l(c) (5); Rev.
Rul. 69-176, 1969-1 C.B. 158; and Rev. Rul. 80-297, 1980-2 C.B.
158.
However, the REIT's distributive share of any fees or
charges associated with the gymnasiums would not constitute
qualifying income under Sec. 856(c) (2) and (3), I.R.C.
AB. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9512014 (December 23, 1994). An S
corporation owned and operated real estate, either directly or
through partnerships. This real estate consisted of office
buildings, apartments, shopping centers, mini-storage areas and a
congregate care facility. The taxpayer hired a related
management corporation at a market rate to provide on-site
management, leasing and contract maintenance, landscaping,
security and other various services depending on the type of
property. The taxpayer provided administrative services as owner
of the real estate.
The Service determined that the rental income received was
not passive investment income for purposes of Sec.
1362(d) (3) (D)(i), I.R.C.
AC. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9513001 (November 28. 1994). In this
Technical Advice Memorandum, the decedent died in 1991 at age 84.
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He was survived by three children. In 1982, the decedent entered
into separate contracts with each of his children to sell
specific parcels of real property. Each contract specified a
purchase price. However, under the terms of each contract,
payments were to be made by each child in amounts and at times
suitable to that particular child. No minimum payment or
schedule of payments was set forth, and no interest was to be
charged. The decedent was to receive all the income from the
property and pay all the taxes and other expenses on the property
until final payment was made. No deed was to be issued until the
final payment was made. During 1982 through 1986, the decedent
forgave $50,000 of the contract price due from each child's
contract. However, there was no contemporary written evidence
regarding such forgiveness. During those years, the decedent
operated the various properties as farms, receiving income and
paying expenses. In 1990, after having a stroke, the decedent
executed deeds conveying the parcels subject to the 1982
contracts to the children.
On that same day, he also entered into three separate
private annuity agreements, whereby he transferred other real
property in return for an initial payment of $10,000 and an
annual annuity payment payable for his lifetime. The present
value of the annuity payments was calculated to equal-the fair
market value of the real property. The initial $10,000 payment
was immediately forgiven by the decedent, and there was no
indication that any child made the next annual annuity payment,
which was due one month before the decedent died in 1991.
The National Office determined that the decedent's transfer
in 1990 of the various parcels of real estate was a taxable gift,
treated as an adjusted taxable gift, for purposes of determining
estate tax liability. The Service determined that a gift did not
occur in 1982 when the contracts were executed because under
local law such contracts were not instruments of conveyance and
because the decedent did not relinquish dominion and control over
the property until 1990. The Service determined that a gift was
made in 1990 and that the value of the gift was the difference
between the fair market value of the property and the
consideration actually paid. It did not take into account the
amounts forgiven because (1) there was no written evidence of
such "forgiveness"; (2) the sales contracts were not revised to
account for any adjustment to the purchase price; and (3) based
on the provisions of the sales contracts, it appeared there was
not a forgiveness of any specific payments under the contract.
The Service also determined that the private annuities did
not constitute adequate consideration in money or money's worth
for the other parcels of real estate. In order to show that
there was adequate consideration, the estate had to demonstrate a
real expectation of repayment and an intent to enforce collection
of the indebtedness. The Service found that the facts supported
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that there was no expectation of repayment and no intention to
enforce collection of the annuity. Instead, the actions of the
decedent indicated he was systematically entering into
transactions for the sole purpose of transferring substantial
property while avoiding Federal estate and gift tax. Thus, the
decedent made gifts in 1990 of the fair market value of the
property transferred to each of his children.
AD. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9514005 (December 23, 1994)_. An S
corporation received rental income from farm land, buildings and
equipment. For a certain period of time, the farm was rented on
a cropshare basis. Under the cropshare lease, the corporation
was not responsible for any of the growing expenses. However,
because its stockholders knew the land better than the tenant,
they were actively involved in the tenant's farming operations as
advisors, unofficial managers and even laborers. More
specifically, the stockholders (1) acted as consultants; (2)
taught the tenant how to use the equipment and storage; (3)
planted and harvested crops; (4) maintained all the farm roads,
tile systems, ditch systems and buildings; and (5) maintained all
equipment. After the cropshare lease ended, the corporation
rented the farm to a new tenant for cash. However, because the
new tenant could not afford the farm help necessary to operate
successfully, two of the stockholders performed the same type of
duties which they had performed during the cropshare lease.
Under
determined
farm land,
income for

all the facts and circumstances, the Service
that the rental income the taxpayer received from the
buildings and equipment was not passive investment
purposes of Sec. 1362(d) (3)(D) (i), I.R.C.

AE. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9514006 (December 30, 1994). This
ruling concerned the consequences of a loan made by a REIT to its
operating partnership. At the same time that the REIT
contributed properties and cash to the operating partnership in
exchange for a general partner interest, it also loaned the
partnership the net proceeds from its debenture offering. These
debentures bore interest payable semiannually until the maturity
date and were unsecured by any interest in real property.
For purposes of the applicable income restriction tests of
Sec. 856(c), I.R.C., the Service determined that, pursuant to
Reg. §1.856-3(g), (1) the amount of the debentures, including
interest, which was proportionate to the capital interest of the
REIT in the partnership would be disregarded; (2) the amount of
the debentures which was proportionate to the capital interest of
the other partners would be considered a non-real estate asset;
and (3) the amount of interest payments proportionate to the
capital interests of the other partners would be interest from an
obligation not secured by any interest in real property.
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AF. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9515005 (December 7, 1994). The
taxpayer intended to elect to be treated as a REIT. This REIT,
simultaneous with an IPO, contributed its leasing service company
assets and cash to Operating Partnership in exchange for
partnership units as its sole general partner. Operating
Partnership owned, directly and through partnerships,
manufacturers outlet shopping centers. In addition, Operating
Partnership owned all of the nonvoting stock and some percentage
of the voting stock of a Service Corporation. Service
Corporation provided development, leasing, marketing and
management services to certain properties owned in part by
Operating Partnership. Operating Partnership had begun to
perform similar management services for the outlet shopping
centers it owned directly. In addition, Operating Partnership,
along with Service Corporation, planned to provide certain
services to the properties owned by the partnerships. For these
services, Operating Partnership and Service Corporation charged
management fees. Alternatively, in certain cases, the partners
of each of the partnerships would be charged their allocable
share of management fees.
The Service determined that, so long as the partnerships
qualified as entities properly treated as partnerships for
Federal income tax purposes, the activities undertaken by
Operating Partnership and Service Corporation for the
partnerships would not cause the REIT's share of otherwise
qualifying rental income from the partnerships to be excluded
fr6m "rents from real property" as defined in Sec. 856(d),I.R.C.
because they would not be disqualified services pursuant to Reg.
§1.512(b)-1(c) (5); Rev. Rul. 69-178, 1969-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Rul.
80-297, 1980-2 C.B. 196; and Rev. Rul. 80-298, 1980-2 C.B. 197.
However, the portions of the development, leasing, marketing
and management fees that were apportioned to the capital
interests of the partnerships' other partners would be considered
non-qualifying income for purposes of Sec. 856, I.R.C.
AG. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9517005 (January 18. 1995). As of
1989, certain real estate assets were held directly or indirectly
by a Foundation, a Marital Trust (one-quarter of which was owned
by the sons of the grantor, with the other three-quarters
ownership being disputed), and the sons of the Marital Trust
grantor in varying proportions. From 1989 until 1993, the
Foundation and the sons were engaged in litigation with respect
to the disputed ownership of the Marital Trust.
In December 1993, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement whereby the common ownership of the properties would be
eliminated. To achieve this result, the parties proposed
engaging in several like-kind exchanges. The Marital Trust
disclosed that, after the like-kind exchanges were effectuated,
the Marital Trust and the Estate would be distributing the
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properties within a short period of time to the Foundation, the
sons and other parties as provided in the settlement agreement.
Such transfers, coupled with some other residuary transfers,
would terminate the Marital Trust and the Estate for Federal
income tax purposes.
The Service determined that the Marital Trust would
simultaneously exchange real property held for investment solely
for other real property to be held for investment, and thus
qualify for non-recognition under Sec. 1031(a), I.R.C. Citing
Rev. Rul. 57-244, 1957-1 C.B. 247, the Service approved the
proposed circular structure of some of the exchanges. The
Service also noted that Sec. 1031(d), I.R.C. could apply because
of mortgages which would be assumed or transferred in these
exchanges. The Service noted that, because the settlement
agreement gave substantial assurances that none of the parties
would make a subsequent disposition within two years, it was
unlikely that the related party rules of Sec. 1031(f) would come
into play.
AH. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9517006 (January 18, 1995). At the
time of his death, the decedent owned 100% of the stock of a
corporation which was in the business of owning and leasing real
estate. The main assets of the corporation were two properties.
One property consisted of office bays leased to unrelated users
on an arms'-length basis, except for one bay which was occupied
by the corporation for management purposes. The other property
consisted of four two-story buildings leased to two users on an
arms'-length basis.
Prior to his death, the decedent exercised total management
responsibility with respect to the business of the corporation.
His responsibilities included advertising for and screening
tenants; negotiating leases; collecting rental payments; and
contracting for, and directly supervising, the work of
maintenance people. In addition, he personally performed day-today repairs and maintenance of the properties. He had the sole
authority to (1) execute all leases and other documents in
relation to the management of the real estate; (2) execute all
sales contracts, mortgages, deed of trust and other documents in
relation to the real estate; (3) open checking accounts and
savings accounts and deal with all other related financial
operations of the corporation; (4) pay dividends and divide
profits; (5) carry out all the purposes of the corporation
described in its articles of incorporation; and (6) execute all
documents necessary for the corporation's dissolution.
The estate requested that the Service determine that the
decedent's interest constitute an interest in a closely held
business for purposes of Sec. 6166(a), I.R.C. Under Sec.
6166(b) (9), I.R.C., the value of any interest in a closely held
business does not include the value-of that portion of the
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interest that is attributable to passive assets held by the
business. Citing Rev. Rul. 75-365, 1975-2 C.B. 471, and Rev.
Rul. 75-367, 1975-2 C.B. 472, for the proposition that the level
of activity is the distinguishing factor in determining the
conduct of an active business from the mere passive ownership of
assets, the Service determined that the scale of management
activity in the corporation was significantly greater than that
described in the Revenue Rulings, and so the decedent's interest
qualified as an interest in a closely held business.
AI. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9519015 (February 7. 1995).
When the
decedent died in 1987, an election was made under Sec. 2032A,
I.R.C. to value specially the qualified real property. The
taxpayer's heir wished to convey this property to a revocable
trust of which he would be the beneficiary, and of which, his
spouse and he would be the trustees. The Service determined that
this transfer would not be considered a disposition of the
property for purposes of the imposition of the additional estate
tax pursuant to Sec. 2032A(c), I.R.C. as long as (1) the taxpayer
and spouse (as trustees) and the taxpayer (as beneficiary)
entered into an agreement to be fully liable for any additional
estate tax and (2) the trust continued to use the property in its
qualified use. The Service also noted that, should the taxpayer
die during the 10-year recapture period, the transfer of the
property on the taxpayer's death would not be considered a
taxable disposition provided the property remained in the wholly
revocable trust or was distributed to the taxpayer before his
death.
AJ. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9522006 (February 15, 1995). The
taxpayer and related persons owned undivided interests in
different tracts of land. The parties agreed that the ownership
arrangement was impractical because it impeded the pursuit of
separate objectives and hindered plans for the eventual
settlement of their family affairs. In order to rectify this
situation, the parties entered into an exchange agreement with an
intermediary whereby they transferred all their interests to the
intermediary and the intermediary transferred whole interests for
eight separate portions to the parties by a single special
warranty deed. Appraisals of the exchange properties show that
the total value of the replacement properties nearly equalled
that of the relinquished properties.
The Service determined that, based on the facts and the
taxpayer's representations, the taxpayer simultaneously exchanged
real property held for productive use in the trade or business or
for investment solely for other real property held for productive
use in a trade or business or for investment, thereby engaging in
a qualified like-kind exchange. However, the Service cautioned
the taxpayer stating that (1) because related persons were
involved, the taxpayer needed to be aware of the possible
application of Sec. 1031(f), I.R.C., and (2) the Service did not
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believe the transaction could be successfully executed either
with or without an intermediary if the values of the properties
being relinquished and received by each of the parties were not
approximately equal.
A husband
AK. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9522040 (March 6, 1995).
and wife held a residential investment income property jointly
with the wife's brother as tenants in common. They mutually
agreed to dispose of the property with the brother investing his
share separately. The husband and wife intended to do a likekind exchange of 50% of the proceeds. The replacement property
was a unit in a condominium development. However, the ruling
stated that it might be necessary to choose a different unit
within the complex prior to the end of the identification period.
The taxpayers requested that the Service determine that the
transfer would constitute an exchange eligible for nonrecognition
under Sec. 1031, I.R.C. The Service determined that it could not
rule on the factual questions of whether the currently held
property or the replacement condominium unit constituted property
held for productive use or investment. However, it stated that,
if these factual questions were affirmative and all requirements
of Reg. §1.1031(k)-i were met, the transfer would constitute an
exchange eligible for nonrecognition of gain under Sec. 1031,
I.R.C.
The
AL. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9523014 (March 10, 1995).
taxpayer is a corporation which proposes to elect S status as of
January 1, 1995. It is in the business of operating and renting
low-income, low-rental residential and commercial real estate.
None of the properties was rented on a net lease basis. The
taxpayer employs a professional property management company for
daily operational decisions with respect to its residential
properties; however, all decisions are subject to taxpayer's
management's approval. Moreover, the taxpayer's management is
actively involved on a day-to-day basis with the management of
the commercial properties.
Under all the facts and circumstances, the Service
determined that the rental income received from the properties
was not passive investment income for purposes of Sec.
1362(d) (3)(D)(i), I.R.C. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9523016 (March
10, 1995).
The
AM. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9523017 (March 10. 1995).
taxpayer is an S corporation which leases out and manages
properties both directly and through partnerships. One of the
stockholders is president, responsible for overseeing the
accounting and property management functions for all the
buildings. The taxpayer directly manages five industrial/
commercial buildings, a condominium and a certain number of
duplexes. The taxpayer and the stockholder also own general and
limited partnership interests in a partnership which owns a golf
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resort consisting of an 18-hole golf course, a full-service
hotel, a restaurant and bar (operated by an affiliated
corporation) and swimming facilities. All management decisions
are made by the stockholder and one other general partner, and
many decisions are implemented by taxpayer staff. The taxpayer
also owns a general partnership interest in an apartment building
that includes swimming pools, a tennis court, a volleyball court,
a basketball court and a clubhouse. Both the stockholder and the
taxpayer are actively involved in the apartment's management.
The taxpayer also owns a property rented on a net lease
basis, as well as two other properties which do not generate
rental income. None of these is covered by this ruling.
Under all the facts and circumstances, the Service
determined that the rental income received from the properties
was not passive investment income for purposes of Sec.
1362(d) (3) (D)(i), I.R.C.
AN. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9524001 (October 11, 1994).
In this
Technical Advice Memorandum, the National Office determined
whether the taxpayer was required, pursuant to Sec. 471, I.R.C.,
to use inventories for the construction materials and supplies it
provided customers under its construction contracts, and thus was
required to change from the cash method to the accrual method.
The taxpayer was a general contractor for both residential and
light commercial construction projects, which included both new
construction and the remodeling/renovation of existing
structures. Taxpayer did not construct any houses or commercial
buildings for speculative purposes. The taxpayer did not
maintain any inventories of construction materials, but rather
purchased the exact amount of materials needed for each job,
usually having the materials delivered directly to the job site.
The taxpayer argued that it was not required to use
inventories for these materials because (1) all of the materials
were specified by the architect; (2) most of the materials were
provided either by the client or by the various subcontractors;
and (3) none of the bills presented to clients separately stated
the cost of those materials. The taxpayer also argued that Reg.
§1.471-1 does not require inventories when the materials are used
for the production of a finished custom product.
The Service was not persuaded by the taxpayer's arguments
and determined that it must use inventories to reflect income
clearly. Citing J.P. Sheahan Associates. Inc. v. Comm'r, TC
Memo. 1992-239, and Independent Contracts. Inc. v. United
States, 94-1 U.S.T.C. 150,135 (N.D. Ala. 1994), the Service
stated that the courts have found that construction contractors
must use inventories for construction materials and supplies.
Citing Reg. §1.446-1(c)(2) as the authority allowing the Service
to require the taxpayer to change its accounting method, the
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Service also stated that the taxpayer was required to use an
accrual method because the use of the cash method did not produce
results that were substantially identical to the results produced
under an accrual method.
The
AO. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9525002 (February 23, 1995).
taxpayers entered into an oral agreement with a corporation
wherein they agreed to exchange standing timber owned by them for
three tracts of timberland. The corporation began cutting all
hardwood and pine timber on 60 acres of land owned by the
taxpayers. Ten days later, the corporation conveyed to the
taxpayers by deed the three tracts of timberland. A week later,
the cutting and removal of all trees was completed, and the
taxpayers conveyed by timber deed "all hardwood and pine timber
now standing or lying on the said land". The deed also stated
that all timber had to be cut or removed within two years of the
deed or it would become the property of the taxpayers.
The National Office in this Technical Advice Memorandum was
asked to determine whether the timber interest conveyed by the
taxpayers and the land conveyed to them were like-kind properties
for purposes of Sec. 1031, I.R.C. The Service determined they
were not like-kind, citing Fleming v. Comm'r, 24 T.C. 818 (1955).
In effect, the taxpayers sold the timber existing on their
property during the contract period. The contract period
amounted to a de facto restriction on the number of trees that
could be removed. Therefore, the corporation's interest was
similar to the limited "carve-out" royalty in Fleming. In
effect, the taxpayers sold trees and bought land; the corporation
sold land and bought trees.
In
AP. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9526001 (September 30, 1994).
this Technical Advice Memorandum, the taxpayers owned interests
(directly and indirectly) in various partnerships. A number of
the partnerships in which the taxpayers were investors lent money
to a number of other partnerships in which the taxpayers also
invested. These borrowing partnerships in turn paid interest to
the lending partnerships. After the issuance of a new Proposed
Regulation, modifying former Temp. Reg. §1.469-11T(a) (2)(iii),
the taxpayers amended their 1989, 1990 and 1991 returns. In
these amended returns, they treated their distributive shares of
the lending partnerships' interest income as self-charged
interest and offset such income with passive activity losses
attributable to their shares of the interest deductions of the
borrowing partnerships on the same loans.
The Proposed Regulation provided that, for taxable years
beginning before June 4, 1991, a taxpayer was not required to
apply the rules in Reg. §1.469-7, but instead could use any
reasonable method of offsetting items of interest income and
interest expense from lending transactions between the passthrough entity and its owners. The taxpayers argued that the
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Proposed Regulation allowed the application of any method which
prevented them from being taxed on transactions in which they
essentially loaned money to themselves. The National Office
concluded, however, that to read this rule as providing relief
via a "reasonable method" standard to entity-to-entity loans
expanded the Proposed Regulation to transactions it was not
intended to cover.
The taxpayer also argued that relief was available under the
authority of Sec. 469(1), I.R.C. regardless of the existence of
Regulations. The Service determined that the self-charged rules
were not self-executing, so that, in the absence of Regulations,
self-charged treatment was not available for items of interest
income or other items.
AQ. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9527020 (April 6, 1995).
The
taxpayer REIT intended to acquire all of the assets of a target
corporation through a statutory merger. The target had been a
"qualified REIT subsidiary" from the date of its incorporation
until it conducted a private offering of its shares to persons
other than its parent. The target intended to elect REIT status
for the short taxable year beginning on the day such status was
lost and all subsequent tax years. The target owned several
subsidiaries which were indirect qualified subsidiaries and would
be direct qualified subsidiaries when the target elected REIT
status.
If the subsidiaries did not qualify as "qualified REIT
subsidiaries" following the merger, the taxpayer REIT would be
unable to satisfy the asset tests of Sec. 856(c) (5), I.R.C. and
the subsidiaries would have to be liquidated at the time of the
merger.
In order to effectuate Congress' purpose in allowing
"qualified REIT subsidiaries", the Service determined that, at
the time of the merger, the subsidiaries would qualify as REIT
subsidiaries of the target. Immediately after the merger, the
taxpayer would be treated as having contributed the assets and
liabilities of the subsidiaries to newly organized corporations
in exchange for 100% of their stock. Accordingly, the new
subsidiaries would be "qualified REIT subsidiaries" following the
merger, and, inasmuch as the taxpayer would have owned 100% of
the stock of at all times during the period that the new
subsidiaries were in existence, they would continue to be
"qualified REIT subsidiaries" so long as 100% of the shares were
owned by the taxpayer REIT.
AR. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9529035 (April 27.
taxpayer owned property which consisted of a
parcels of land which were listed as one tax
represented that the property was not a farm
one residence for over 20 years and that the
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1995).
The
residence on four
lot. The taxpayer
and had been used as
structures were

integral to the use of the property as a residence. Because the
parcels were shown as one tax lot, the Service determined that
the property constituted a residence and adjacent land not in
excess of that which was reasonably appropriate for residential
purposes for purposes of Reg. §25.2702-5(c).
AS.

Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9530020

(April 28, 1995).

An

individual owned and used a single-family home as his principal
residence. He disappeared and has since been missing. However,
he had not been determined to be deceased under state law because
he had not been missing the requisite seven-year period. The
missing individual's administrator sold his house to unrelated
parties. The administrator wanted to elect the $125,000
exclusion pursuant to Sec. 121, I.R.C. The administrator argued
that, because the missing individual met the age and use
requirements, he, as a fiduciary, should be able to "step into
the shoes" of the missing person under Reg. §1.121-4 and Rev.
Rul. 82-1, 1982-1 C.B. 26.
However, the Service determined that the administrator could
not make the election. It stated that the authority cited by the
administrator stands only for the proposition that a fiduciary
may make an election when there is some evidence that the
affected taxpayer intended to sell the home. This rationale was
buttressed by G.C.M. 37673 (December 30, 1980), which noted, in
the context of Sec. 1033, I.R.C., that, if a taxpayer had not
taken reasonable steps towards replacement of the condemned
property before dying, nonrecognition treatment would not be
applicable to a fiduciary's acquisition of replacement property.
Thus, because there was no evidence that the missing person
intended to sell his home prior to disappearing, the election
could not be made.
VI.

CASES

On June 29,
Adams v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 2297 (1995).
A.
1987, the taxpayer purchased real property for use as a personal
residence. The purchase price was $124,000. Over the next two
years, he made improvements totaling $15,908. Sometime in 1988,
the taxpayer became unemployed. As a result, in June 1989 he
moved out and leased the property for a lease term ending
December 31, 1989, thereby converting his personal residence into
rental property.
In September 1988, petitioner entered into an agreement with
a realtor listing the residence for sale at a price of $145,000.
He received no offers at this price. In October 1989, the
property sold for $130,000, subject to the remaining lease
period. On his 1989 income tax return, the taxpayer took a
$12,905 loss on the sale of the property. In addition, he
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claimed various deductions with respect to the property for the
period January 1 through October 23, 1989.
Pursuant to Reg. §1.1001-1, for purposes of determining
loss, the fair market value of the property at the time of
conversion was fundamental to the question of whether the loss
was allowable. The Service argued that the fair market value of
the rental property was $130,000 at the time of conversion. The
taxpayer argued that the value was $145,000.
The Court stated that, although generally the purchase price
of property changing hands between two unrelated parties is
highly reflective of fair market value, in this case the taxpayer
was unemployed, was 2 years in arrears in property taxes and
behind on his mortgage payments. Based on these circumstances,
the Court held that the taxpayer was compelled to enter into the
sales transaction. Because the buyers knew the taxpayer's
circumstances, they were in a position to negotiate a price below
market value. The Court found that the buyers taking the
property subject to a lease provided further evidence that the
purchase price was not reflective of the property's fair market
value. The court concluded that the fair market value of the
property was $135,000 at the time the property was converted,
thus allowing a $5,000 loss.
The Court also held that expenses incurred by the taxpayer
prior to the date of conversion could not be deducted, but that
the expenses incurred after conversion were deductible under Sec.
162(a), I.R.C.
B.

Adler v. Comm'r,

F.3d

,

95-1 USTC

50,098 (Cl.

Ct. 1995).
In 1987 and 1988, the taxpayer reported significant
passive activity losses. These losses were partially deductible
for regular tax purposes. However, the taxpayer was subject to
the alternative minimum tax ("AMT"), under which no losses were
deductible. Thus, no tax savings were achieved in 1987 and 1988.
The taxpayer took the losses sustained in 1987 and 1988 that were
unused in her regular tax net operating loss deduction and
carried these amounts back to reduce her 1984 and 1985 regular
and AMT net operating loss deductions. Looking to the purposes
for enactment of Sec. 469, I.R.C. and the statutory language
thereofi the Court found that:the taxpayer was not allowed to
have these losses enter into a computation of net operating
losses in 1987 and 1988, and thus could not carry them back to
the earlier years.
C.
Belden v. Comm'r, 70TCM 274 (1995).
On December 19,
1988, the taxpayers entered into a contract for the purchase of a
residence and took possession within 2 weeks. The purchase
contract committed taxpayers to paying $500,000; $20,000 was paid
to the seller as an earnest money deposit, $80,000 was to be in
the form of a promissory note to the seller and $400,000 was to
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be permanent financing. The purchase contract was subject to the
condition subsequent that the seller obtain suitable financing
for the $400,000 under terms acceptable to the taxpayers.
On January 16, 1989, the taxpayers entered into an occupancy
agreement providing the taxpayers with immediate rights of
occupancy. Until permanent financing was arranged, the occupancy
agreement required the taxpayers to pay the seller $3,500 a
month. This $3,500 was equal to the interest being paid by the
seller on his outstanding construction loan. It was the parties'
understanding that the taxpayers would bear the $3,500
construction mortgage interest charge as long as they possessed
the house and until permanent financing could be obtained. All
utilities were to be placed in taxpayers' names, and taxpayers
agreed to obtain liability and contents insurance. Following a
2-month transition period, the taxpayers were responsible for the
costs of repairs to plumbing, heating, cooling, electrical
equipment and appliances. The taxpayers paid in excess of
$13,000 to repair, maintain or improve the property during 1989.
If the sale ultimately was unsuccessful, the taxpayers were
liable for any damage that they caused to the property.
The taxpayers did not close on the purchase contract. The
taxpayers ultimately purchased the house from a foreclosing bank.
After commencement of the foreclosure proceeding, and prior to
taxpayers' purchase, the taxpayers paid the $3,500 monthly
payments directly to the bank.
On their 1989 and 1990 Federal income tax returns, taxpayers
claimed the $3,500 monthly payments as deductible interest
payments. The Service argued that the payments were rent and not
interest.
Noting that this was a unique set of circumstances, the
Court held that the taxpayers were entitled to qualified
residence interest deductions. Pursuant to Sec. 163(h) (3),
I.R.C., the Court determined that (1) the interest was paid on
acquisition indebtedness because the payments were designated as
interest in the occupancy agreement and were paid to the bank,
either directly or indirectly, (2) the loan was incurred to build
a qualified residence, and (3) the property secured such loan,
with the taxpayers ultimately receiving title from the bank.
Under Reg. §1.163-1(b) and Baird v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 115
(1977), interest is deductible where the taxpayer is the legal or
equitable owner of the property even if the taxpayer is not
directly liable on the debt. Thus, the Court had to determine
whether the benefits and burdens of ownership had been
transferred to the taxpayers prior to 1991. The Court found that
such benefits and burdens had shifted once the taxpayers took
possession because, under applicable Oklahoma law, they had an
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equitable ownership interest and they had assumed many of the
burdens of ownership based on the occupancy agreement.
D.
Brown Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 105 (1995).
Brown Cayman, a controlled foreign corporation ("CFC"), owned a
88% interest in a Cayman Island partnership, Brinco. The
partnership acted as the Brazilian purchasing agent for Brown
Cayman and its affiliates. It was paid a 10% commission. At
issue was whether Brown Cayman's share of partnership income from
Brinco was foreign base company sales income, includable as
Subpart F income, in the consolidated income tax return of the
group. The taxpayer argued that it was not Subpart F income
because Brinco's income was not derived in connection with the
purchase of personal property from any person on behalf of a
related person. Brinco was not a related person to Brown Cayman
or its affiliates under Sec. 954(d) (3), I.R.C.
The Tax Court first filed an opinion in this case on April
12, 1994, Brown Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 616 (1994). The
Court found there that the income received from Brinco was not
Subpart F income. Its rationale was that Brinco was not a CFC,
and so its income could only be Subpart F income to Brown Cayman
if its existence as an entity was ignored and Brown Cayman was
treated as if it engaged in the activities of Brinco.. The Court
found that Brinco should be respected as an entity and that
characterization of income was to be made at the partnership
level. That opinion was subsequently withdrawn, and this
reviewed decision was issued.
In this decision, the Court held that the income was Subpart
F income. The Court based its opinion on a close reading of the
Regulations under Subpart F, a consideration of the structure and
language of Subchapter K, Congress' purpose in enacting Subpart
F, and certain language of Sec. 954(d) (1), I.R.C. Based on Reg.
§1.952-2(c) (1), which lays out a scheme under which the U.S.
shareholder of a CFC must determine the foreign base company
sales income of the CFC under most of the rules applicable to a
domestic corporation determining its tax liability under Sec. 11,
I.R.C., the Court concluded the rules of Subchapter K should be
applicable to this situation.
Under Subchapter K, Brinco is required separately to state
its commission income in order to give effect to Sec. 702(a) (7),
To do otherwise, the Court
I.R.C. and Reg. §1.702-1(a) (8)(ii).
held would frustrate Congress' purpose in enacting Subpart F.
The court also stated that, to accomplish Congress' purposes for
enacting Subpart F, the aggregate or conduit nature of Brinco as
a partnership rather than as an entity must be emphasized. The
Court found that, although the cases required an entity level
determination of income, once that determination was made, the
partnership was ignored and the individual partners took into
account the income as if they had earned it directly. The Court
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and other courts had attributed to a partner the activities and
even the property of a partnership to determine whether the
partner had a particular status important for determining some
aspect of the partners' Federal income tax status. Thus, Brown
Cayman should be put into the shoes of Brinco for determining
whether Brown Cayman was earning commission income on sales by
third parties to its affiliate.
The Court (with three concurring opinions and one dissenting
opinion) found such a relationship existed. It held that Brown
Cayman was a CFC whose distributive share of partnership profits
was, by design and reality, connected to and dependent on
purchases made on behalf of a party related to Brown Cayman.
E.
Estate of Cervin v. Comm'r, 68 TCM 1115 (1994). On
December 3, 1988, the date of his death, the decedent owned an
undivided 50% interest in approximately 657.3 acres of farm real
estate and an undivided 50% interest in a homestead, both located
in Texas. His children owned, in equal shares, the remaining 50%
interests in these properties. The fair market value of the farm
at the date of decedent's death was $650,000. The fair market
value of the homestead at the date of decedent's death was
$625,000. In the estate tax return, the undivided one-half
interest in the farm was valued at $243,750 and the undivided.
one-half interest in the homestead was valued at $234,375. The
Service initially disallowed any discounts for the decedent's
fractional interests. At trial, it conceded that some discount
was appropriate but maintained that the fractional interest
discounts should be 6.54% with respect to the farm and 8.20% with
respect to the homestead. The taxpayer contended that a
fractional interest discount of 25% was appropriate for both
properties.
The make-up of the farm's 634.76 acres was that 40% was
suitable for farming, 30% was suitable for ranching and the rest
was floodplain. Any partition would result in an amount of land
well below the minimum amount of acreage necessary for profitable
operation. Both parties' experts agreed that some discount was
appropriate with respect to the farm because partition would be
difficult. The taxpayer's expert concluded that a 25% discount
was appropriate because of the following factors: (1) partition
was not feasible because of the farm's varied soil type and
configuration, its limited access to a paved road and the
uneconomical amount of acreage suitable for farming that would
remain; (2) the lack of control associated with a minority
interest in property; (3) the lack of marketability of a
fractional property interest; and (4) the difficulty of obtaining
mortgage financing for the purchase of a fractional interest.
The Service's expert felt the farm was easily partitioned and
that the discount should be 6.54%, representing a fractional
discount and the costs of partition. The Court held that the
farm could be partitioned on the basis of value but this would
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involve substantial legal costs, appraisal fees and delay so that
a 20% discount was appropriate.
With respect to the homestead, both experts agreed that the
homestead was not capable of partition and therefore would be
subject. to a forced sale. The taxpayer's expert decided that a
25% discount was appropriate based on the fact that any potential
purchase of decedent's fractional interest would require a
substantial discount to offset the legal costs and appraisal fees
associated with bringing about a forced sale of the homestead.
In addition, he argued that, because the home was in need of
substantial repair, any potential purchaser of decedent's
fractional interest would require a discount for repair costs as
well as for a fractional interest. The Service's expert
testified that the homestead would sell quickly in a forced sale
because of its lot size and desirable location. The Court
concluded that a 20% discount was appropriate. The taxpayer's
expert's reliance on the poor condition of the homestead was
misplaced because that condition was already considered in
determining the agreed fair market value of the homestead.
DeMauro v. Comm'r, 68 TCM 721 (1994). The taxpayer
F.
sold his residence on December 14, 1989. The gain on the sale of
the residence was $88,004. He did not report any gain on the
sale of the property on his 1989 Federal income tax return. At
all relevant times, taxpayer maintained his personal residence
within the United States and did not roll over the gain. In a
letter dated November 29, 1989, the taxpayer requested that the
proceeds from the sale be held on deposit until after January 12,
1990. However, neither the contract nor the settlement provided
for any type of escrow arrangement. The settlement took place on
December 14, 1989, and provided for cash in the amount of
$133,429.74, after adjustments, to be paid to seller.
The Service issued a notice of deficiency with respect to
the 1989 year because of the taxpayer's failure to report the
gain. The taxpayer made the following three arguments: (1) he
was unable to meet the Sec. 1034, I.R.C. requirements because a
lien was placed on his bank account by the Service relating to
the 1985 year; (2) he intended to relocate to England; and (3) he
reported the gain in 1990 because the proceeds were not
distributed from an escrow until 1990. The Court found none of
these arguments to be acceptable because (1) decisions
consistently hold that the time limits of Sec. 1034, I.R.C. are
uniformly applicable, and the courts are without authority to
weigh the merits of the events causing delay; (2) the taxpayer
never moved to England; and (3) the taxpayer did not prove the
existence of a valid escrow.
G.
DunneQan v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 239 (1995). On May 31,
1985, the taxpayer's parents and taxpayer purchased a singlefamily house in New Jersey.. The taxpayer and his parents
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acquired the property as tenants in common. The purchase price
was $149,900. The taxpayer and his parents each paid
approximately $20,000 cash and obtained a 30-year loan of
$111,750. From July 1985 until August 1988, they rented the
property. In August 1988, the taxpayer sold his primary
residence for $225,000. His selling expenses were $11,000 and
his adjusted basis was $102,000 at the time of the sale. When he
filed his 1988 Federal income tax return, he stated he was
deferring the recognition of gain because he intended to buy a
new residence within the prescribed replacement period. On
August 30, 1988, the taxpayer moved into the rental property
under.an oral agreement (between his parents and him) that he
would pay all of the property's expenses as rent. On February
21, 1990, he gave his interest in the property to his parents.
On July 31, 1990, the taxpayer agreed to repurchase the property
from his parents for its then fair market value of $215,000.
The taxpayer argued that he should be allowed to include the
original mortgage liability in his cost of purchasing the new
residence from his parents because the property was subject to
the liability at the time he purchased it. The Court held that
the taxpayer could not include such amount because the debt had
been incurred outside the replacement period. The Court stated
that the taxpayer was ignoring the language of Reg. §1.10341(c) (4) (ii), which sets the time frame for incurring acquisition
costs with respect to a replacement residence.
,
Eastwood Mall Inc. v. United States,
F. Supp.
H.
In 1982, the-- taxpayer, as a
95-1 USTC 50,236 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
member of a partnership, purchased a piece of property which was
being developed into a mall. The property consisted of 100 acres
of mountainous terrain with sharply contrasting elevations. In
order to develop the property as a shopping mall, the land had to
be leveled. This leveling was done by reshaping the mountains
and valleys into a flat earthen plateau. The costs for clearing,
blasting, filling and grading totalled $9,674,743. In 1985 and
1986, the partnership included these costs as part of the total
depreciable cost of the mall building, depreciating the building
using a 15-year life.
Citing Aurora VillaQe ShoppinQ Center. Inc. v. Comm'r, 29
TCM 126 (1970), and Rev. Rul. 80-93, 1980-1 C.B. 50, the Court
held that these costs were incurred for permanent improvements
inextricably associated with the land, and thus were nondepreciable. The Court pointed out that these costs would not be
reincurred if the mall building was rebuilt or replaced, and so
the plateau was not subject to exhaustion, wear and tear or
obsolescence. The Court contrasted the treatment of these costs
with the costs incurred in digging spaces and trenches in the top
of the plateau for the mall building's foundations and utilities,
which the government had not disputed were part of the mall
building's depreciable cost basis.
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Gehl v. Comm'r,

F.3d

,

95-1 USTC

50,191

(CA8

In this case, a creditor held a recourse note from the
1995).
taxpayers with a balance due of $152,260. Pursuant to a
restructuring agreement on December 30, 1988, the taxpayers
transferred to the creditor 60 acres of farm land having a fair
market value of $39,000 and a basis of $14,384. On January 4,
1989, an additional 141 acres, having a fair market value of
$77,725 and a basis of $32,080, were transferred, $6,123 was paid
in cash and any remaining debt was forgiven. The taxpayers were
insolvent both before and after the transfers and the discharge
of indebtedness.
The taxpayers argued that the entire set of transactions
should be considered together and treated as income from the
discharge of indebtedness. The Tax Court found in favor of the
Commissioner. In doing so, it "bifurcated" its analysis of the
transaction, considering the transfers of land and the discharge
of the remaining debt separately.
Affirming the Tax Court, the Eighth Circuit, in a decision
which was designated as being not for publication, held that the
taxpayers' transfers by deeds in lieu of foreclosure of their
land in partial satisfaction of the recourse debt were properly
considered sales or exchanges for purposes of Sec. 1001, I.R.C.
The Eighth Circuit cited Reg. §1.1001-2, Ex. (8), Estate of
Delman v. Comm'r, 73 TC 15 (1979), and DanenberQ v. Comm'r, 73
T.C. 370 (1979).
Guenther v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 2980 (1995). Metropolitan
J.
was an S corporation engaged in the business of renting and
managing apartments and condominiums. Its shareholders were the
taxpayer and his daughters. For purposes of Sec. 453(g), I.R.C.,
Metropolitan and the taxpayer were related taxpayers. On January
18, 1988, the taxpayer sold two parcels of real property
containing condominiums to Metropolitan for $1,038,026, which was
made up entirely of mortgage assumption. At the time of the
transfer, an officer of the bank holding a second mortgage on the
properties approved the taxpayer's transfer, but did not require
or suggest that the transfer be made. For purposes of Sec.
453(g), I.R.C., the properties were depreciable property. The
taxpayer reported the gain from the sale of the properties on the
installment method from 1988 to 1992. In each year, the taxpayer
said the property was not sold to a related person.
The rule of Sec. 453(g) (1), I.R.C. states that installment
sale reporting is not allowed on a sale of depreciable property
between related parties if tax avoidance was a principal purpose
of the transfer. The taxpayer argued that tax avoidance was not
a principal purpose because he transferred the properties to
avoid foreclosure by the bank. However, the Court did not find
this explanation convincing. Instead, it looked at the
depreciation benefit to Metropolitan arising from the stepped-up
161SCS9o.2H

A80

-

76

-

basis and the tax benefits which the taxpayer received from the
transfer and concluded that the transfer was engaged in for the
principal purpose of tax avoidance. The Court found the taxpayer
to have received the following tax benefits: (1) the deferral of
gain over several years while keeping some control over the
property and (2) the ability to offset suspended passive losses
through the passive characterization of the gain. Additional
support for this holding came from the failure to identify the
sale as a related party sale.
K.
HigQins v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 2281 (1995). In 1984, the
taxpayers purchased a house for $325,000. As of May 26, 1989,
the taxpayers had an adjusted cost basis for the house of
$381,998. They used the house as their personal residence from
the date of purchase until May 1989. On May 26, 1989, the
taxpayers entered into a contract to lease the home, with the
tenant having an option to buy. The tenant paid taxpayers
$20,000 for the option. Additionally, the lease/option provided
that $1,000 of each $3,055.79 monthly lease payment would be
applied against the agreed prospective purchase price of
$295,000, if the option were exercised by January 31, 1990. The
option was in fact exercised.
On their 1990 tax return, the taxpayers took a loss,
pursuant to Sec. 165(c), I.R.C., on the difference between their
determination of fair market value at the date of conversion of
the home from personal to business use, $350,000, and the sales
price of $295,000. Under Reg. §1.165-9(b) (2), the Service
disallowed this loss, stating that the fair market value of the
property was not its adjusted basis, but rather the selling price
of $295,000. Finding that the fair market value was $295,000,
the Court held that the taxpayers had no deductible loss, because
on the date of conversion the taxpayers knew they could not sell
the property for any greater amount.
L.
Holmes v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 42 (W.D. NY
1994).
The taxpayers, a mother and her son, formed a partnership
to purchase shares of a cooperative apartment in Brooklyn
Heights, N.Y. Because the son was living there, they had the
opportunity to buy at a discounted price. While the
partnership's initial costs exceeded its income, the partners
understood that the apartment potentially represented a very
profitable investment. The son continued to live in the
apartment after the purchase and during 1985 and 1986.
For these two years, the taxpayers' tax returns reflected
the partnership's income and losses generated by the apartment.
Upon audit, the Service disallowed most of the losses on the
asserted grounds that the rent charged to the son was not a fair
rent, and that the partnership itself was not engaged in an
activity for profit. The taxpayers paid and filed claims for
refund upon which they partially prevailed. They then instituted
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a refund suit for the remaining amounts. The jury found that the
partnership was engaged in an activity for profit and had charged
a fair rent. The government, in this case, was asking for that
judgment to be overturned as a matter of law. Its argument was
based on whether Sec. 280A, I.R.C. applies to the shares of a
cooperative apartment.
The Court held that, based on the statute's language, its
legislative history, the limited scope of Sec. 216, I.R.C. and
the case law prior to the enactment of that provision, Sec. 280A,
I.R.C. does not apply to the ownership of shares of a cooperative
corporation. The shares of a cooperative corporation do not
constitute "a dwelling unit" as defined by Sec. 280(f) (1)(A),
I.R.C. Although the government argued that substance over form
required that the taxpayers be treated as if they took deductions
with respect to a dwelling unit, the Court found no citation of
authority for such a proposition. The Court noted that Sec. 216,
I.R.C. did not redefine the meaning of real property to include
cooperative apartments, but instead extended certain deductions
to certain tenant-stockholders while retaining the distinction
between owners of stock and owners of real property. Thus, the
Court held that the jury verdict would stand.
Estate of Hudgins v. Comm'r, 57 F.3d 1393 (.CA5 1995).
M.
The decedent was a Texas rancher who died testate in 1987. In
his will, he left several tracts of ranch property to various
combinations of five grandsons. On the estate tax return, the
"Yes" box was checked on the question asking whether the estate
intended to elect special use valuation on any of its property.
A "Notice of Election" was attached, but it contained only nine
of the fourteen items required by the instructions and the
Regulations. Only three of the five grandsons signed the
election, with the explanation that one was not available and the
other was in the military. The notice stated that it would
remedy this lack of signatures, but no steps were taken until the
Service audited the estate return and notified the estate that
its special use valuation election was defective. Within 90 days
after receiving that notice, the estate submitted all previously
missing information, documentation and signatures. The Tax Court
held that the estate was entitled to the special use valuation
because the estate's initial election substantially complied with
the election requirements, entitling it to perfect its election
within the statutory period following notice of the defects.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision, holding
that the estate had not substantially complied with the election
requirements. The three requirements of election under Sec.
2032A, I.R.C. are (1) checking the appropriate box and completing
Schedule N, thereby evidencing the intention to make such an
election, (2) completing and attaching to the return a Notice of
Election containing the information specified and (3) attaching a
Recapture Agreement that has been signed by all parties with
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interests in the property to be specially valued, expressly
consenting to the imposition of the additional tax and to be
personally liable to pay it in the event of a premature
disposition of the property or cessation of its qualified use.
Citing the legislative history of Sec. 2032A, the Court noted
that Congress had stated that, in order to be eligible for
perfection after the fact, both a notice of election and a
recapture agreement valid under state law and signed by all
parties must be included with the estate tax return. In this
case, the estate did not meet this standard. The Court noted
that the decisions in McDonald v. Comm'r, 853 F.2d 1494 (CA9
1988), McAlpine v. Comm'r, 968 F.2d 459 (CA5 1992), and Prussner
v. United States, 896 F.2d 218 (CA7 1990) were consistent with
its decision.
The taxpayers
Hustead v. Comm'r, 68 TCM 342 (1994).
N.
one
for
zoned
were
which
lots
contiguous
three
purchased
residential dwelling per acre. In 1989 and 1990, the taxpayers
expended $26,000 and $22,000, respectively, on challenging the
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. They deducted these
expenses, and the Service disallowed the deduction on the theory
that the costs should have been capitalized under Sec. 263A,
I.R.C.
The Court found the expenses were capitalizable, but under
Sec. 263, I.R.C., rather than Sec. 263A, I.R.C. Sec. 263A,
I.R.C. was held to be inapplicable because (1) the zoning
challenge did not cause the property to be "produced", and so it
did not qualify under Sec. 263A(b) (1), I.R.C., and (2) the
property did not qualify as property acquired for resale under
Sec. 263A(b) (2), I.R.C. because the taxpayers did not hold the
property for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business. The expenses were found to be capitalizable under Sec.
263, I.R.C. because the increased fair market value attributable
to the zoning challenge constituted a benefit which extended
beyond the taxable years in which incurred.
Johnston v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 1749 (1995). In 1980, the
0.
taxpayers purchased a residential duplex home for $70,000. At
the time of the purchase, one half of the duplex was rented. The
petitioners continued to rent that half of the duplex until May
of 1987, when they decided to renovate the property. The
taxpayers resided in the other half of the duplex. In May, the
taxpayers started the renovation of the duplex and spent $102,820
in renovation expenses for 1987. Renovation continued through
August 1988, and they spent an-additional $16,313 in renovation
expenses. The duplex retained 95% of its original walls after
the renovation, and it was stipulated that the building was
substantially rehabilitated within the meaning of Sec.
48(g) (1) (C), I.R.C. The building was originally constructed in
about 1914 but, it was not listed in the National Register of
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Historic Places, was not located in a registered historic
district and was not a "certified historic structure".
The taxpayers argued they were entitled to a 10% investment
tax credit under Sec. 48, I.R.C. for the rehabilitation of their
qualified residential rental property. The Service argued that
the taxpayers were not entitled to an investment tax credit
because the duplex did not constitute "section 38 property", as
the duplex was used predominantly for lodging within the meaning
of Sec. 48(a)(3), I.R.C.
The taxpayers claimed that the lodging exclusion provided in
Sec. 48(a) (3), I.R.C. applied only to personal property used in
the quarters of a hotel, motel, inn, dormitory or any other
facility where sleeping accommodations are provided, and did not
apply to the building itself.
The Court held that the taxpayers were not eligible for the
credit based on the statute, the legislative history and case
law, all of which demonstrated that the investment tax credit
pertaining to qualified rehabilitation expenditures for a
qualified rehabilitated building was unavailable if the property
was a noncertified historic structure used predominantly for or
in connection with the furnishing of lodging within t.he meaning
of Sec. 48(a)(3), I.R.C.
P.
Johnston v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 2283 (1995). Sometime in the
summer of 1982, a limited partnership promoter approached the
taxpayer to ascertain whether he would be interested in
participating in the organization of a real estate limited
partnership that was to acquire, own and operate a shopping
center in the Detroit area. The taxpayer agreed to participate
in the formation of the partnership and to serve as its general
partner. In September 1982, the limited partnership was formed
under the laws of Michigan. Its initial capital was $100, $90 of
which was paid by the taxpayer in return for a 90% general
partner interest and $10 of which was paid by another individual
in return for a 10% limited partner interest. This limited
partner was to withdraw upon the admission of investors who
agreed to purchase the limited partner interests. Forty units
were offered for sale at $200,000 per unit. According to the
private placement memorandum, the taxpayer was to serve as the
general partner, making no capital contribution but owning a i%
capital interest. It noted that "this compensation will be
received despite no capital contribution

.

.

.

[and]

.

.

.

He

will also receive a one-time organization fee of $30,000." All
of the contributions received by the investors were held in
escrow until the partnership purchased the shopping center, which
occurred in December 1982. The Service determined in its notice
of deficiency that the 1% capital interest had a fair market
value of $80,808, which was includible in the taxpayer's gross
income upon receipt.
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The taxpayer made two arguments regarding the Service's
evaluation. The taxpayer argued that either (1) he received his
partnership interest for a capital contribution of $90, and not
in return for services or, alternatively, (2) he received his
interest in return for services, but in September 1982, so that
the fair market value of such interest must be determined as of
that date, and not as of late December 1982.
The Tax Court determined that the taxpayer's arguments
ignored Reg. §1.721-1(b) (1), which specifically states that a
shift in capital from one partner to a service partner can occur
subsequent to the formation of a partnership. Citing Mark IV
Pictures, Inc. v. Comm'r, 969 F.2d 669 (CA8 1992), the Court
noted that, in order to determine whether such a capital shift
occurred, it was necessary to examine the effect on the taxpayer
of a hypothetical liquidation of the partnership occurring
immediately after the partners received their partnership
interests. Because the limited partners did not receive their
interests until late December 1982, the Court held that was the
appropriate time at which to determine whether the limited
partners shifted part of their capital to the taxpayer in return
for services. If the partnership had been liquidated as of that
time, the taxpayer would have been entitled to 1%, or a total of
$80,808 in cash and negotiable installment notes. Thus, each
limited partner shifteo capital to the taxpayer.
The Court found this holding to be bolstered by the
statements in the private placement memorandum that (1) a
dilution of the limited partners' investment would occur as a
result of their giving the taxpayer a 1% interest in the capital
and (2) the reason this shift occurred was to compensate the
taxpayer. The record also established that the taxpayer did
perform certain services for the partnership.
The Court then looked to see whether the transfer of the
capital interest was conditioned on the completion of future
services by the taxpayers because, if it was, the fair market
value of that interest would have to be determined at the time
such services were rendered. The Court held that, although the
taxpayer was obligated to perform some minimal future services
after the capital shift, the record did not establish that the
transfer was conditioned on the performance of future services.
Thus, the Court held the taxpayer should include $80,808 in
income in 1982.
Finally, the taxpayer argued that the valuation of the
interest was less than this amount because the interest was an
unlimited liability general partnership interest and some of the
value was based on installment notes which were uncollectible.
The taxpayer, however, failed to offer any evidence that would
have provided the Court with an informed, reasoned basis on which
to find that the fair market value was less.
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Kingstowne L.P. v. Commissioner, 68 TCM 1497 (1994).
In the summer of 1984, the sole shareholder (Halle) of a
corporate land developer learned about the existence of a land
tract suitable for residential development located in Fairfax
County, Virginia. The owners of the tract had submitted an
application to rezone for increased development rights. In
February 1985, Halle reached an agreement with the shareholders
of the tract owner to purchase all of the stock. He then formed
the taxpayer, a partnership, for purposes of acquiring the stock.
On March 8, 1985, the taxpayer and the stockholders entered
into a stock purchase agreement whereby the partnership would pay
$29 million for the stock of the tract owner. A $3 million
downpayment, consisting of $2 million in cash and $1 million in a
non-interest bearing promissory note, was paid on that date. The
purchase agreement entitled the taxpayer to defer settlement,
which was scheduled to occur on April 26, 1985, on a monthly
basis until October 1, 1985, provided that the taxpayer did not
default under the purchase agreement and it paid in advance
$225,000 per month. The $225,000 monthly payment approximated a
return on the unpaid purchase price of 10%. The agreement stated
that, should the taxpayer fail either to settle or to pay the
$225,000, then any monthly installment paid would be forfeited as
liquidated damages and the parties would have no further rights
or liabilities to each other.
In addition, the purchase agreement obligated the taxpayer
to pay all rezoning costs incurred after March 15, 1985.
However, the tract owner was obligated to continue to operate the
land tract in the normal and usual manner and to pursue the land
tract rezoning until settlement.
The taxpayer extended the settlement date by paying four
payments of $225,000. Settlement finally occurred on August 23,
1985. The taxpayer treated these payments as nonemployee
compensation sending Forms 1099-MISC to each of the tract owner's
stockholders. The sellers objected to the issuance of the forms
by the partnership and treated the fees as additional sales
proceeds paid for their stock. On its tax return, the taxpayer
treated the payments as deductible interest.
I
The Court held that the payments were additional purchase
price, not deductible interest, finding the taxpayer's arguments
unpersuasive.
First, the taxpayer argued that it had an unconditional and
legally binding contractual obligation to pay the balance of the
purchase price; therefore, the payments represented interest
because they compensated the sellers for the delay in their
receipt of the unpaid purchase price balance. The Service
countered that the taxpayer merely had an option to purchase.
The Court held that, although there might be circumstances where
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an executory contract creates an unconditional obligation
supporting an interest deduction, this contract did not create
such an obligation. Instead, the Court found these circumstances
to be similar to Midkiff v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 724 (1991), and
Kaempfer v. Comm'r, TC Memo 1992-19.
The taxpayer's second argument was that substantially all of
the benefits and burdens of ownership of the land tract were
transferred as of the original settlement date, April 26, 1985,
so that the payments were interest on debt arising under an
executed contract of sale. The Court held that the taxpayer
failed to demonstrate that it was the beneficial owner of the
tract prior to the date of final settlement. The Court noted
that, although the partnership was responsible for reimbursing
the sellers for any rezoning costs incurred after March 1985, the
sellers retained primary liability for such costs as well as for
any mortgage debt which constituted a significant burden of
ownership.
R.
Kopen v. Comm'r, 70 TCM 72 (1995). On April 23, 1980,
the taxpayer sold his entire leasehold interest in property
located in Honolulu, Hawaii. Pursuant to the terms of that sale,
the buyer was to make a downpayment at the time the sales
contract was signed, monthly interest payments thereafter, and
payment of the balance of the purchase price no later than April
23, 1983. On his 1983 tax return, the taxpayer elected to
exclude his gain of $11,360 based on Sec. 121, I.R.C. In June
1987, the taxpayer purchased a leasehold interest in property in
Kailua, Hawaii and began to use it as his principal residence.
On January 5, 1988, he purchased the underlying land. In August
1990, he sold his entire interest. On his 1990 income tax
return, he excluded $125,000 of gain pursuant to Sec. 121, I.R.C.
from his return.
The taxpayer argued that, under Hawaiian law, he sold his
interest in the Honolulu property in 1980, and not in 1983, and
that he was not 55 years of age when that sale occurred. Thus,
the 1983 election was invalid and no election was made in 1980.
The Service argued that the taxpayer was not entitled to elect in
1990 because he was estopped under the duty of consistency from
denying his previous election.
The Court agreed with the Service. The duty of consistency
is an equitable doctrine that prevents a taxpayer from adopting a
position for a particular year and, after the period of
limitations has expired for that year, adopting a contrary
position that affects his or her tax liability for an open year.
The Court further noted that (1) the duty of consistency can
apply to a taxpayer receiving a double tax benefit as a result of
transactions which are not the same or related and (2) the
mitigation provisions did not provide an adequate remedy for the
Service.
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This case had
Lawler v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 1699 (1995).
S.
many issues, only one of which is related to real estate. In
1976, creditors of the taxpayer commenced an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding against him. In this proceeding, the
Service asserted claims against the taxpayer for income tax
liabilities for his taxable years from 1967 through 1978. In
1980, the taxpayer settled the tax issues with the Service by
executing a tax settlement agreement, which was approved by the
bankruptcy court and became effective on December 20, 1983. The
agreement provided that all liabilities of the taxpayer and of
his related entities for income taxes, interest and additions to
tax for the 1969-1978 taxable years would be satisfied by the
taxpayer's payment of $3 million in taxes, $2 million in
interest, and additional interest of 11% on the unpaid balance of
the $3 million tax liability. The taxpayer made a $1 million
cash payment in 1984, and executed and delivered a $4 million
note for the remaining principal and $2 million in interest.
This note was secured by a deed of trust on the Lawler Farm. The
taxpayer resided in a house built on a 39.8-acre parcel of the
farm and used the remaining acreage in his farming business.
The taxpayer did not timely pay the Service under the
agreement. The Department of Justice attempted to collect on the
note beginning in 1988. The taxpayer paid $2 million on the
principal of the note in June 1989, and paid interest of
$3,020,740 in December 1989. The taxpayer reported his payment
of the interest on his 1989 Schedule C as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. In amended returns, the taxpayer
asserted that the interest was deductible because it was
qualified residence interest under Sec. 163(h), I.R.C., and that
he was making a protective selection of the Lawler Farm as the
"one other residence" defined in Sec. 163(h) (4)(A) (i)(II), I.R.C.
The Service argued that this interest was personal interest,
and so was only 20% deductible in 1989. The Service further
argued that this interest could not be qualified residence
interest because the taxpayer designated the farm as his "one
other residence" at, or after, the time that he petitioned the
Court. The Court held that the timing of the taxpayer's
selection did not defeat or otherwise lessen the validity of the
selection. In addition, the note was secured by the residence
from its making until its payment in full. Thus, the Court held
that the taxpayer could deduct the interest as qualified
residence interest.
Marcaccio v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 2420 (1995). In February
T.
1984, the taxpayer and 11 other individuals formed a partnership
for the purpose of developing a parcel of real property in Texas.
The taxpayer was a general partner. The partnership borrowed
$2,980,000 from a bank. The bank secured the property with a
deed of trust and a security agreement. As additional
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collateral, the bank required each partner personally to
guarantee payment of a portion of the note principal. The
taxpayer executed a guaranty in the amount of $336,000 in August
1984. In January 1986, the partnership borrowed an additional
$300,000 from the bank. Again the bank required each partner
personally to guarantee payment of a portion of the principal
amount. The taxpayer executed a guaranty in the amount of
$33,750.
The partnership was unable to develop the property and fell
into default on the notes. In November 1986, the property was
sold to the bank at public auction for $2,441,000. At the time
of the foreclosure sale, the partnership owed the bank
$3,280,000, the sum of the principal amount of each of the two
promissory notes. Therefore, after the sale there remained a
deficiency in the amount of $839,000. The partnership reported a
long-term capital loss associated with the foreclosure in the
amount of $471,499, of which the taxpayer was allocated $35,362.
The return also allocated recourse liabilities to the taxpayer in
the amount of $62,925, which represented his portion of the
$839,000 deficiency.
In June 1987, the bank's attorneys sent a letter to the
partnership stating that, unless payment was made of .the $839,000
deficiency plus accumulated interest, a suit for collection would
be filed. Suit was filed in early 1988 against the partnership
and the partners. In March 1988, the taxpayer and the bank
agreed to settle, with the taxpayer paying the bank a total sum
of $31,250. In July 1988, the court dismissed the taxpayer from
the suit. The taxpayer did not report any income from the
discharge of indebtedness on his 1988 return.
The Service determined that the taxpayer had income from
discharge of indebtedness in the amount of $31,675 -- the

difference between his share of the deficiency ($62,925) and the
amount paid ($31,250).
The taxpayer was unable to prove
satisfactorily that (a) the foreclosed property had a fair market
value in excess of the debt outstanding; (b) the settlement
constituted the compromise of a disputed debt; or (c) that the
second guaranty was intended to replace the first guaranty.
U.
Moore v. Comm'r, 68 TCM 660 (1994). On September 2,
1987, the taxpayer sold his interests in various partnerships to
Porter, who already owned an interest in each of the entities
sold, for $80,000 plus Porter's assumption of the taxpayer's
obligation with regard to one.of the partnership's debts. In
connection with the sale, the other co-guarantors of the
partnership's debt signed a waiver of contribution in favor of
the taxpayer. At the time of sale, the taxpayer had a $420,066
negative capital account balance in the partnership with the
debt. In November of 1987 and January of 1988, the partnership's
creditor and the partnership entered into modification agreements
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regarding the partnership debt. The taxpayer neither signed the
agreements nor transferred any property to the creditor. On the
taxpayer's return, he reported the negative capital account
balances as long-term capital gain, but he characterized the
income as income from discharge of indebtedness and offset the
reported capital gain by claiming an exclusion from income
pursuant to Sec. 108, I.R.C. According to the taxpayer, his
share of partnership debt was not assumed by Porter, because
Arizona law does not allow the debts of a partner to be assumed
by a third party without the consent of the lender. Instead, it
was discharged by the creditor after the September 1987 sale,
when the creditor entered into the modification agreements which
the taxpayer did not sign, thus terminating his obligation. The
Court disagreed with the taxpayer, stating that he had misread
Weiss v. Comm'r, 956 F.2d 2452 (CAll 1992) and Barker v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo 1983-643. The court found there was no discharge of
indebtedness.
V.
Moores v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 1797 (1995).
On September 1,
1986, the taxpayer entered into a contract to purchase an office
building located in Casper, Wyoming. As of this date, the
building was subject to a lease which obligated the lessee to pay
a rent which exceeded market rent until April 30, 1989. The
purchase price for the property was $2,210,644. The various
documents memorializing the sale did not purport to allocate the
purchase price among the building, land, personal property or the
lease.
The taxpayers allocated $932,715 of the total purchase price
to the building and reported depreciation deductions computed
under the straight line method over 19 years. At the same time,
the taxpayers allocated $1 million to the premium value of the
lease as a separate, depreciable asset, and began amortizing it
over the 32-month remaining rental period. The Service
disallowed the amortization deductions for the taxable years 1986
through 1989.
The Court noted that its position with respect to treating a
lease as a separate depreciable asset was uniformly to reject the
proposition that the premium value of a lease could be the
subject of an amortization deduction under the circumstances
presented. It noted that this position had been upheld by the
Fourth Circuit in Schubert v. Comm'r, 286 F.2d 573 (CA4 1961).
It did note that such position had been reversed in Comm'r v.
Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (CA9 1953), but that appeal in this case
would not lie in that Circuit.- The Court held that the value of
the lease (whether favorable or unfavorable) is reflected in the
value of the property which it encumbers.
W.
Salih v. Comm'r, 68 TCM 1487 (1994). The taxpayer
sought deductions for a home office, but failed to qualify under
guidelines issued prior to Comm'r v. Soliman, 113 S.Ct. 701
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(1993). During 1988 and 1989, the taxpayer worked as an employee
for some hospitals and medical clinics and as an independent
contractor for others. He typically worked at one hospital or
clinic one day and at a different hospital or clinic the next,
working 8-hour shifts at each location. Because none of the
hospitals or medical clinics provided taxpayer with an office,
taxpayer set up an office in his apartment. He spent
approximately 70% of his work time at the various hospitals and
clinics and the other 30% of his work time in his home office.
The time the taxpayer spent in this office was devoted primarily
to reading medical publications, watching and listening to
medical video and audio tapes, and maintaining the books and
records relating to his medical practice.
After Soliman was decided, the Service stated, in Notice 9312, 1993-1 C.B. 298, that home office deductions taken for years
prior to 1992 would not be challenged if the taxpayer's situation
reasonably fell within either the example set forth in Prop. Reg.
§l.280A-2(b) (3) or the example in Publication 587. The taxpayer
argued that the example provided in Publication 587, involving an
outside salesperson whose only office was in his home, was
similar to his situation and should be controlling. The Court
held, however, that the example relied on the fact that the
salesperson spent a substantial amount of time in the office
maintaining business records and making appointments. This was
different from the taxpayer, inasmuch as he spent little time in
his office maintaining the records relating to his medical
practice. Thus, the taxpayer was not entitled to the deductions.
Estate of Sharp v. Commissioner, 68 TCM 1521 (1994).
X.
The decedent and her husband owned several properties, some
jointly and some individually, which they began to transfer to
their four children in equal shares, beginning in the late 1970s.
The Service made adjustments to the estate tax return with
respect to certain of these properties.
Fort Gatlin Shopping Center
Prior to 1982, decedent and her husband owned a one-half
interest in a shopping center, with the other one-half interest
owned by two unrelated persons. Because of business disputes,
these unrelated parties sought to liquidate their interest by
sale to a corporation formed by decedent's children to manage and
operate properties. In September 1981, the unrelated parties
sold their one-half interest to the corporation for a purchase
price of $272,500. In February 1982, decedent and her husband
transferred their one-half interest in the shopping center to
their four children as tenants in common.
The Service determined that the market value of the interest
transferred by decedent and her husband was $386,000 on the date
of transfer so that decedent was determined to have made a
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taxable gift to her children of $153,000 (50% less four annual
$10,000 exclusions), which was treated as an adjusted taxable
gift in calculating the taxpayer's estate tax. The taxpayer
argued that the decedent's interest was worth $136,250 on the
date of the transfer, because the other one-half interest in the
shopping center was sold in an arms'-length transfer less than 5
months earlier for $272,500.
The Court held that the value of the decedent's interest was
$136,250. In addition to noting certain problems with the
Service's appraisal of the property, it determined that the
third-party sale was valid evidence of fair market value because
the unrelated parties were not under any compulsion to sell.
Fitch and OsQood Groves
In March 1985, the decedent executed quitclaim deeds for the
transfer of two groves to her two daughters. However, these
deeds were never delivered or recorded. Sometime after these
deeds were executed, the decedent's two sons heard about the
deeds. Believing they were entitled to the groves, the sons had
deeds to the properties prepared. In June, shortly after the
decedent's hospitalization for dizziness and fatigue, the sons
took the deeds to their mother's home where they were-executed.
These deeds then were recorded.
In early 1986, when one of the daughters did not receive a
real estate tax bill with respect to these groves, she discovered
the existence of her brothers' deeds and informed her mother. In
March 1986, a demand letter was sent to the sons from their
mother stating that it had not been her intention to transfer the
groves to her sons. The sons refused to reconvey the groves and
her lawyer told her she would have to bring suit to recover the
properties. In September 1986, the decedent was adjudicated
incompetent. A bank was appointed guardian of the decedent's
property, whereupon it retained an attorney to conduct an
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the grove deeds.
As part of this investigation, the groves were appraised at a
fair market value as of April 28, 1987 for $3,265,000. The
decedent died on May 31, 1987. In October 1987, the daughters,
in their capacity as the estate's personal representatives,
brought suit against their brothers for cancellation and
rescission of the deeds on the grounds of undue influence, fraud
and misrepresentation. In January 1988, the court held that the
deeds were procured by undue influence and misrepresentation and
that the deeds were void.
These groves were not reported on the estate tax return.
Instead, a claim for recovery of real estate and for ancillary
damages was reported with a date-of-death value of $1,226,522.
This value was intended to represent a discount from the 1987
bank appraisal to account for the risk of an unsuccessful outcome
I6SISs9o.2H
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in the litigation necessary to enforce decedent's claims and for
the delays associated with such litigation. The risk discount
taken was 50%. The Service determined that the fair market value
of the decedent's interest at death was $3,265,000 and that the
allowable discount on the property did not exceed $98,531, the
total amount of attorney's fees and litigation costs incurred in
resolving the dispute.
The Service's position was that, because decedent's transfer
was judicially set aside, her estate must include the full value
of the groves less costs to resolve the title dispute. The
estate argued that, because of the circumstances surrounding the
transfer, at the time of her death decedent only owned a cause of
action for the recovery of the groves which must be discounted
substantially.
The Court determined that decedent's interest in the groves
at her death was worth something less than the full value of the
groves and that the argument over what sort of interest she
possessed was essentially academic. The Court held that an
appropriate discount was 25%, rather than 50%, because the
taxpayer's experts failed to consider how the facts affected the
risks of litigation. The Court noted that it was troubled at how
the decedent managed to reduce the value of the groves by making
an invalid "gift", but believed these facts to be unusual. It
characterized the use of this case as a basis for estate planning
as extremely hazardous.
Y.

F.3d

Tollis v. Comm'r,

,

95-1 USTC

50,076

(CA6

In 1958, the taxpayer-purchased approximately 69 acres of
1995).
land in Ohio. After subdividing the parcel and building a road
through it, he built condominium and apartment complexes on parts
of it. In 1979, the taxpayer decided to retire. When his son
expressed no interest in developing the land, he sought buyers
for the remaining undeveloped property. In January 1980, he
negotiated an option contract to sell the remaining land. In
1983, after purchasing three of the nine parcels, the buyer
cancelled the option contract. The taxpayer reacquired the three
parcels and began seeking new buyers for the undeveloped land.
He also developed some of these parcels. The Tax Court held that
the taxpayer realized ordinary income from the sale of this
property in various years because the property was held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
The taxpayer appealed, arguing that, while he was a real
estate developer, he had never-sold undeveloped land before.
Thus, the sales could not be in the ordinary course of his
business. The Sixth Circuit found this reasoning to be
unpersuasive and affirmed the Tax Court in an opinion designated
as not for publication. The Court stated that use of the
taxpayer's reasoning, in many circumstances, would give a
business a "free pass" to capital asset status the first time it
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did something new. In this case, the taxpayer purchased the land
intending to develop it and developed portions of it over the
course of two decades. Absent objective contemporaneous facts
showing a change of intent, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
property was not a capital asset.
Z.
Von-Lusk, A California Limited Partnership v. Comm'r,
104 T.C. 207 (1995). The taxpayer, a partnership, was formed for
the purpose of managing, holding and developing 278 acres of raw
land. During 1988, 1989 and 1990, the years at issue, no
physical activities with respect to the land occurred because the
taxpayer was contesting (1) the county's development fee and (2)
a number of conditions which had been imposed in 1989 at the time
of tentative plat approval. During these years, the taxpayer
engaged independent contractors to meet with government
officials, obtain building permits and zoning variances,
negotiate permit fees, perform engineering and feasibility
studies and draft architectural plans. However, the land was
used for agricultural purposes by tenant farmers. The Service's
Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment disallowed interest
expense, taxes and other administrative deductions based on the
argument that the taxpayer was "producing property" under Sec.
263A, I.R.C., and so the expenses should be capitalized. After
the initial pleadings were filed, the Commissioner conceded the
interest disallowance.
The Court held that the expenses had to be capitalized under
Sec. 263A, I.R.C. because the activities associated with the
costs represented the first steps of development. In looking to
the legislative history, the Court found that Congress (1)
expected a single set of comprehensive rules to apply to the
capitalization question and (2) needed "produce" to be defined
broadly in order to give full effect to the capitalization
provision. The Court stated that Congress meant to include as
capitalized costs the preliminary, nonphysical steps of
development.
One of the arguments that the taxpayer brought up was that
property could not be "produced" causing the capitalization of
direct and indirect expenses until its "production period" (the
time at which interest begins to be capitalized) began. Under
the interest capitalization rules, the production period begins
when there is physical change to the land. The Court held that
the interest capitalization rules of Sec. 263A(f), I.R.C. should
be read narrowly, rather than expansively. The Court also found
to be without merit the taxpayer's arguments that (1)
"production" should be read consistently with Sec. 312(n) (1),
I.R.C. (the adjustment to earnings and profits for construction
period carrying charges) and (2) certain of the expenses at issue
were specifically excluded from capitalization under Reg.
§1.263A-lT(b) (2)(v) (A) and thus were deductible.
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AA. Walgreen Co. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 582 (1994).
The
taxpayer operated retail drugstores throughout 30 states. The
dispute pertained to depreciation deductions claimed by taxpayer
with respect to certain real property leasehold improvements
(Sec. 1250, I.R.C. leasehold improvements) made by the taxpayer
between September 1, 1980 and August 31, 1984. The leasehold
improvements in dispute consisted of (1) interior partitions made
up of drywall, glass and metal; (2) miscellaneous millwork,
carpentry, lumber, metals, steel and paint; (3) acoustic, drywall
and plaster ceilings; (4)restroom accessories; (5) electric
lighting fixtures; (6) interior floor finishings, including
carpet, vinyl, rubber tile, ceramic tile, quarry tile and
terrazzo tile; and (7) decor finishes, including wood trim,
decorative steel work and simulated structures.
With respect to the leasehold improvements placed in service
before January 1, 1981, the taxpayer claimed depreciation
deductions under Sec. 167, I.R.C. under the ADR class life
system, using a seven-year useful life for the property. For the
property placed in service on or after January 1, 1981, the
taxpayer took ACRS depreciation under Sec. 168, I.R.C. using a
useful life of 10 years. The taxpayer calculated the useful
lives based on its belief that the improvements were classified
under ADR Class 57.0. For the years in question, ADRClass 57.0
included assets used in wholesale and retail trade, and personal
and professional services.
The taxpayer argued that ADR Class 57.0 included certain
items of Sec. 1250, I.R.C. property that did not constitute the
structural shell of a building or an integral part thereof and
that the leasehold improvements at issue met this criterion. The
Service argued that the legislative intent behind the applicable
depreciation Sections prevented Sec. 1250, I.R.C. property from
being included in any ADR class unless such class explicitly
contained Sec. 1250, I.R.C. property.
After examining the history of the ADR class system and the
legislative changes made to the depreciation deduction during
this time period, the Court held that Congress intended that the
class life for categories of Sec. 1250, I.R.C. property had to be
explicitly prescribed, and not merely by inference, particularly
in light of Treasury's difficulties in establishing workable
class lives. Thus, the leasehold improvements were defined as
15-year real property because they did not have a class life.
This determination was buttressed by the fact that if these
improvements were classified as land improvements, they would
still have been considered 15-year property.
AB. Wiseman v. Comm'r, 69 TCM 2564 (1995). The taxpayer
reported on her 1989 income tax return a passive loss distributed
to her from her 25% interest in Man O'War limited partnership
(LP), and passive income distributed to her from her 25% interest
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in the Richmond Road/Man 0'War Joint Venture (JV). She
aggregated the loss and the income. In 1982, JV had acquired an
undeveloped tract of land (Land) which was leased to Man O'War
general partnership (GP), whereupon GP constructed improvements
(LP was a
and leased those improvements to third parties.
In
general partner in GP, owning 85% of the interests therein.)
1989, more than 85% of the total unadjusted basis of the Land and
the improvements owned by GP consisted of real property; and more
than 30% of the total unadjusted basis of the Land and the
improvements owned by GP consisted of depreciable property. Less
than 30% of the unadjusted basis of property owned by JV with
respect to its ownership of the Land consisted of depreciable
property. The passive income claimed on the taxpayer's return
reflected her distributive share of ground rents received by JV
for the lease of the Land to GP. The passive losses reflected
her distributive share (from LP, via its interest in GP) of the
net loss incurred by GP from its leasing of the improvements to
third parties.
The Service disallowed the aggregation of the income and the
loss and recharacterized the income from JV as nonpassive income
Pursuant to this
pursuant to Temp. Reg. §l.469-2T(f) (3).
Temporary Regulation, if less than 30% of the unadjusted basis of
the property used or held for use by customers in a rental
activity is subject to the allowance for depreciation, an amount
of gross income from the activity equal to the taxpayer's net
passive income from the activity shall be treated as not from a
passive activity. The taxpayer argued that she could aggregate
because the partnerships' undertakings were one activity inasmuch
as they constituted an appropriate economic unit.
The Court held that the taxpayer could not aggregate her
income and loss. They determined that the application of the
passive loss rules hinges on a determination of a taxpayer's
"undertakings" and "activities". Because the operations of JV,
GP and LP were not owned directly by the same person, nor was the
taxpayer a direct owner of any of these undertakings, each
partnership was a separate undertaking pursuant to Temp. Reg.
§1.469-4T(c) (2) (v). Thus, each undertaking was a separate
activity unless such undertakings could be aggregated. The Court
held that the undertakings could not be aggregated as rental
activities under Temp. Reg. §1.469-4T(k) (2) (i). This was because
Temp. Reg. §l.469-4T(k) (6) states that rental activities where
less than 30% of the basis of rented property is subject to
depreciation cannot be aggregated with other rental activities.
Since JV was such an activity, it could not be aggregated with
GP.
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